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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1879 case of Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan,1 Justice Field,
sitting as Circuit Justice, heard a constitutional challenge to a San
Francisco ordinance requiring all male prisoners, upon incarcer-
ation in the county jail, to cut their hair to a "uniform length of
one inch from the scalp."2 Plaintiff Ho Ah Kow, a Chinese citi-
1 12 F. Cas. 252 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (No. 6,546).
2 Id. at 253.
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zen jailed for five days, 3 was shorn of his queue4 by the county
sheriff. Deprivation of the queue was at that time regarded by
certain Chinese as a mark of disgrace, attended, according to
their religious beliefs, by misfortune and suffering after death. 5
Although the ordinance was invalidated on equal protection
grounds, Justice Field recognized the free exercise of religion
6
dimension of the case and analogized the hair length require-
ment to a regulation that would force Orthodox Jewish prisoners
to eat pork. Such a regulation, he noted, would be "an offense
against their religion" and "notwithstanding its general terms,
would be regarded as a special law in its purpose and
operation." 7 In a commentary on the case, Judge Cooley wrote
that constitutional protection for the incarcerated requires that
"[c]onvicts have all the rights of other citizens, except as these
are limited by the sentence of the law and proceedings for its
proper execution."8 The hair length ordinance, Cooley wrote,
was "not important to the preservation of discipline in the
prison, or to the due enforcement of the sentence" and was
therefore an unconstitutional abridgment of a Chinese prisoner's
rights.9
Today, nearly one hundred years after Ho Ah Kow, the
courts are still faced with the question when "the sentence of the
law and proceedings for its proper execution""' constitutionally
justify denying prisoners' religious claims to wear their hair and
regulate their diets in the manner dictated by their beliefs. Con-
fronted with the ageless tension between the commands of con-
science and the demands of society-a tension articulated in the
' Ho Ah Kow was jailed for violating an ordinance that prohibited "any person
[from] sleeping or lodging in a room or an apartment containing less than five hundred
cubic feet of space in the clear for each person occupying it." Id.
4 A queue is a long braid made of the hair remaining after the front portion of the
head is shaved. Id.
5 Id.
6 The first amendment prohibits Congress from enacting any law "respecting an es-
tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
7 12 F. Cas. at 255. The problem of Jewish prisoners in America being denied
provisions that will enable them to eat in accordance with kosher dietary laws antedates
the establishment of the United States. Reuben Etting, a Revolutionary War soldier
captured by the British, died of starvation rather than eat pork, the main staple pro-
vided him in captivity. Levin, The Solis-Cohens: Philadelphia's Grandees, The Philadelphia
Inquirer, Sept. 12, 1976 (Magazine), at 21.
8 18 AM. L. REG. 676, 686 (1879); accord, Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445
(6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945) (per curiam) ("A prisoner retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
from him by law.").
9 18 Am. L. REG. 676, 686 (1879).
10 Id.
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biblical injunction to "[r]ender therefore unto Caesar the things
that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's"' '-the
courts must reconcile these interests. The task is especially dif-
ficult in the context of contemporary prisons, where Caesar is a
demanding presence whose just domain is not easily identified.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit suggested
that the personal appearance of a prisoner is a concern of the
state. Presented with allegations that prison officials were inter-
fering with several Sunni (orthodox) Muslims' free exercise of
religion by compelling them to shave their facial hair, 12 the court
stated: "It may well be that the state's interest in hygiene and
identification of inmates outweighs the prisoner's interest in
growing a beard as required by his religion .. ".. ,13 A year
earlier, however, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed a decision that evaluated the competing institutional
and inmate interests in control of hair length and concluded that
the free exercise of religion claim must prevail. The case, Teterud
v. Gillman,14 involved an American Indian whose faith required
the wearing of long, braided hair; like Ho Ah Kow, he success-
fully challenged a requirement that all prisoners have uniform,
short haircuts.
Contrary results were also reached on essentially identical
facts in two recent cases presenting the hypothetical posed by
Justice Field-the right of Orthodox Jewish inmates to kosher
diets. In Kahane v. Carlon,'15 the district court, in a decision af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,16 upheld
"Matthew 22: 21.
12 Black Muslims believe that "it is against the nature of the creation of Allah, that
one should shave the hair off his face and thus resemble women, defacing the nature
of man." M. Sayed Adly, About the Beard of Muslims 1 (sermon) (1976) (delivered in
New York Muslim shrines). This injunction against shaving is believed to be "fard
(obligatory)." Id.
11 Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1976). The district court
viewed the prison regulation as plainly justified and dismissed the complaint without
requiring defendants to respond. Subsequently, the Second Circuit reversed and re-
manded for development of the record in a factual hearing on the beard claim and also
on allegations that prison officials prohibited wearing prayer caps and extensive pray-
ing, both prescribed by the Muslim religion.
1' 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), aff'd sub nom. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d
357 (8th Cir. 1975). See also Maguire v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D. Conn.
1975) (prison regulation allowing prisoners to wear beards based on religious conviction
only if they had beards when first incarcerated impermissibly presumed that asserted
religious beliefs of all prisoners claiming to have acquired a belief after incarceration are
spurious).
is 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir.), aff'g United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
11 Id. See also Jihaad v. Carlson, 410 F. Supp. 1132, 1135 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (hearing
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Jewish Defense League leader Meir Kahane's claim that a denial
by prison authorities of his request for kosher food violated the
first amendment. Another district court in the Second Circuit,
however, rejected a claim by imprisoned Jewish Defense League
members for provision of a kosher diet.
17
These inconsistencies in judicial behavior are largely at-
tributable to the peculiar position that these cases occupy. The
free exercise of religion in prison marks the intersection of two
strong and antagonistic lines of constitutional law: the preferred
rights of religious practitioners and the diminished rights of the
imprisoned. The first amendment right to the free exercise of
religion has enjoyed a position of special prominence in the
realm of constitutional values.1 8 Long considered one of the
"preferred" freedoms, 19 free exercise has recently received such
respect from courts and legislatures that some commentators
have referred to the "supremacy" of that clause. 211 Significantly,
this development, pioneered by the Warren Court, has con-
tinued under the Burger Court.
21
A more restrictive approach, however, characterizes the
Burger Court's decisions on the constitutional rights of
prisoners. 22 Although no religious liberty cases have yet reached
the Court, 23 its disposition of other prisoners' rights issues sug-
on the merits ordered on Muslim inmate's complaint that he was placed in segregation
for refusing to shave his beard and then fed only pork sandwiches-the consumption of
which his religion proscribes--and oranges).
1" United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated for lack of jurisdiction,
520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1975); cf. Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Ill. 1976)
(upholding prison officials' refusal to allow food in cell of Muslim during Fast of
Ramadan, which requires partaking of food before sunrise).
"8 See generally, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
'9 See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
20 Pfeffer, The Supremacy of Free Exercise, 61 GEO. L.J. 1115, 1140 (1973); Saladin,
Relative Ranking of the Preferred Freedoms: Religion and Speech, 1964 RELIGION & PUB.
ORD. 149, 171.
21 Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), with Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
22 Compare, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process requires hearing
prior to suspension of public high school student), and Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
163 (1939) (existence of alternative channels of communications does not justify sup-
pression of free speech), with Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976) (due process
does not require hearing prior to transfer of prisoner), and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 823-28 (1974) (existence of alternative channels of communication justifies
abridgment of prisoners' free speech).
23 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam), was a § 1983 action brought by a
Buddhist inmate who alleged that Texas prison officials were punishing him for at-
tempting to proselytize his faith. The Court held that the district court improperly
19771
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gests that an inmate's free exercise claim would not be given as
much weight as the typical nonprisoner's free exercise claim.
Prisoners' procedural due process rights, for example,
broadened in the landmark case of Wolff v. McDonnell, 4 have
recently been restricted. 25 More relevant to the free exercise
question is the Court's treatment of prisoners' free speech
claims. In this area, the Court has either strained to avoid de-
termining to what extent incarceration justifies an infringement
of preferred first amendment rights, 26 or confronted this issue
by applying a test that for decades has been inapplicable to gen-
eral free speech litigation.27 In addition, the Court has displayed
extreme deference toward the defenses urged by prison officials,
resulting in uncritical acceptance of asserted institutional
needs.28 The tendency of the Court to treat cases involving pris-
oners' first amendment rights differently than cases involving
other citizens' nondiminished rights clearly identifies the dis-
tance separating religious rights and prisoners' rights on the
Court's constitutional map.29
Thus, the recent grooming and diet cases, involving the col-
lision of these two lines of constitutional doctrine, are charac-
terized by uncertainty. Not only have opposite results been
reached on essentially identical facts, but different tests have
been applied."' The interests of neither the inmates nor the
institution are well-served when the law is so unclear that it con-
tains no identifiable standard for determining infractions.3 1 Yet
this is the present situation with respect to the religious rights of
prisoners. At least seven distinct tests have been applied in the
dismissed the complaint, and remanded for a factual hearing. Justice Rehnquist filed a
dissenting opinion. Id. at 323.
24 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
25 See Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S. Ct. 2543 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct.
2532 (1976); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
26 See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407-09 (1974).
27 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823-28 (1974); note 22 supra.
28 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 829-35 (1974). The Court here upheld
against first amendment attack a California prison regulation prohibiting media inter-
views with particular inmates. California defended the rule on the theory that such
interviews would turn inmates into "big wheels" whose notoriety would impair prison
discipline. Despite petitioners' vigorous challenge to this "big wheel" theory, the Court
deferred to the judgment of corrections officials that the danger was real and required
a total ban.
2 9 See Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2542 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 825-26 (1974).
30 See notes 168-278 infra & accompanying text.
31See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974); notes 198-216 infra &
accompanying text.
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
past decade to free exercise claims of prisoners; 32 often, two or
more tests have been applied by the same court to different
claims. 3 3 Although this area has been extensively litigated, 34 it is
as unsettled as it was ten years ago and can provide a crucible for
forging a coherent approach to the scope of prisoners' rights as
well as to the range of religious liberty generally.
35
This Comment will first survey the existing law concerning
the free exercise of religion in prison and then identify and
evaluate the numerous tests that have been applied in this area.
It will reject, for a variety of reasons, all of those tests except the
"compelling interest" standard traditionally applied to free exer-
cise claims, which requires that any infringement be justified by
a compelling state interest and be achieved through the least
drastic means available to further that compelling end.36 This
test will be accepted on the theory that because the values under-
lying the free exercise clause are largely the same inside and
outside prison, the test for an infringement of the free exercise
clause should also be the same. The compelling interest ap-
proach will then be analyzed, so that latent ambiguities in the
definitions of "compelling interests" and "least drastic means"
may be resolved. The refined compelling interest test will at that
point be modified specifically to serve the free exercise in prison
issue, by categorizing the possible justifications for abridging the
religious rights of prisoners into two levels of importance. In-
terests that fall into the lower level will rarely pass the refined
test, while those in the higher level will usually pass the compel-
ling interest prong of the test, but must then satisfy a modified
"least drastic means" requirement. Finally, this test will be ap-
plied to the grooming and diet cases, reaching the same result as
Teterud37 and Kahane,38 but with greater doctrinal precision. Al-
though much of the discussion in this Comment is relevant to
32 See notes 168-278 infra & accompanying text.
33 Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224, 1238 (D.N.J. 1976) (compelling interest and
clear and present danger tests); Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F. Supp. 871, 877 (N.D. Cal.
1975) (compelling interest, clear and present danger, and reasonableness tests). See also
Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1243-44 (2d Cir. 1972).
3
4 See Hollen, Emerging Prisoners' Rights, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1972).
35 For a discussion of the prison environment as a microcosm of the problem of
free exercise of religion in society generally, see Frankino, The Manacles and the Mes-
senger: A Short Study in Religious Freedom in the Prison Community, 14 CATH. U. L. REV. 30,
43-44 (1965).
36 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963). This test will be analyzed in
detail in notes 279-342 infra & accompanying text.
37 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
38 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
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prisoners' rights generally, the test and conclusions are confined
to free exercise claims.a9 The first amendment embodies a con-
sidered decision that religious pursuits are to be specially
protected, 4" and the wisdom of that judgment is beyond reevalu-
39 See note 352 infra.
' This Comment will not treat the threshold issue in all free exercise cases--that is,
whether the interest asserted is a religious one. No peculiar problems are presented
simply because the person raising the free exercise claim is a prisoner. Unlike the ques-
tion whether an infringement is justified, which is complicated by the needs of the
correctional system, the determination of what is religious for the purposes of the first
amendment is not altered by either the fact or the theory of confinement. Although
specific practices that are protected when engaged in by nonprisoners may be held
regulable when pursued by inmates, the preliminary question whether those practices
are religious is identical in both cases. For a discussion of this definitional inquiry, see
Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455-60 (1971); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 336-43 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 173-85 (1965); Torcaso v.
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 & nn. 10 & 11 (1961); Boyan, Defining Religion in Opera-
tional and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); Freund, Public Aid to
Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686 n. 14 (1969) ("It may be suggested that a
conventional definition of religion or religious practice is controlling in applying the
non-establishment clause, while a heterodox version is entitled to protection under the
free-exercise clause, which safeguards the nonconformist conscience."); Comment, De-
fining Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHi. L. REV. 533, 550-51
(1965) ("parallel importance" test: "[ain individual or group belief is religious if it oc-
cupies the same place in the lives of its adherents that orthodox beliefs occupy in the
lives of their adherents"). The Supreme Court has authorized not only an inquiry into
whether an allegedly protected practice is religious but also an inquiry into whether it is
sincerely pursued by the claimant. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965)
("the threshold question of sincerity ... must be resolved in every case"); see Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457 (1971); note 306 infra.
A recent line of cases that deals with the question of what is a bona fide religion
coincidentally happens to involve prisoners. Harry William Theriault, a federal prisoner
in Atlanta, founded in the early 1970's an organization known as the Church of the
New Song (CONS). Styling himself as the Bishop of Tellus and working through the
Fountainhead Seminary, whose facilities consisted largely of his cell, Theriault spread
the Gospel of his Eclatarian Faith through the Atlanta prison. Corrections officials,
doubting CONS' legitimacy and fearing the consequences of an organized group of
inmates, attempted to suppress the incipient church. Theriault brought a free exercise
suit against the prison, and the district court ruled, in an often-cited decision, that until
such time as CONS demonstrated otherwise, it was to be considered a bona fide reli-
gion for first amendment purposes, and was not to be suppressed. Theriault v. Carlson,
339 F. Supp. 375, 382-85 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated and remanded, 495 F.2d 390 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974). Shortly after this victory a sect within the
church nearly provided evidence that the district court in Carlson had suggested would
suffice to remove CONS from the protective scope of the religion clause. This episode
involved a formal request to the Federal Bureau of Prisons for 700 porterhouse steaks
and 98 bottles of Harvey's Bristol Cream Sherry with which to celebrate the sect's ritu-
als. Theriault immediately proclaimed the request "unsanctioned" and disavowed any
doctrinal affiliation with those members responsible for the incident. N.Y. Times, Sept.
24, 1972, at 57, col. 1.
Encouraged by the judicial recognition of CONS, Theriault began an aggressive
proselytizing campaign that led to the organization of Eclatarian churches in peniten-
tiaries in Illinois, Iowa, and Texas, among others. The belief persists among prison




II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. A Short History of Religion in Prison
A certain irony pervades the history of the free exercise of
religion in prison. Although contemporary American correc-
tional institutions are characterized by the debilitating demands
of the state-demands that often impede religious practice--our
prisons were originally isolated asylums in which offenders were
to render unto God the reverence and obedience that they had
wrongfully denied Him by committing crimes.42 This approach,
pioneered by William Penn and the Quakers and implemented
in 1789 at the Walnut Street Gaol in Philadelphia, 43 was a
humanitarian alternative to the common law penalty of death for
all felonies. Instead of being executed, the convict was provided
with a place
in which he could cogitate about his salvation, become
reacquainted with his God, and do penance. Hence, the
name of the institution-"penitentiary." When such a
reassessment of self had occurred, the offender could,
theoretically, return to the community, literally a "new
man." This religious foundation of the institution led to
conditions much like those endured by others who
sought God. Like seminarians, prisoners were subjected
to physical pain, sparse food, and isolation from the
community.
44
The religious impulse that animated the "Pennsylvania" system
of imprisonment evoked awe around the world and became a
guiding influence in the European corrections community. 45
forced to litigate to secure their asserted free exercise rights. Although some of these
suits have been successful, see, e.g., Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F. Supp. 537 (S.D. Iowa
1973), aff'd per curiam, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974), not
all federal courts have accepted the legitimacy of CONS. See, e.g., Theriault v. Silber,
391 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Tex. 1975); Theriault v. Establishment of Religion on Tax-
payers' Money, No. CV 70-186D (E.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 1975); Hundley v. Sielaff, 407 F.
Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
41 See generally P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-30 (1964).
42
See D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 85-86 (1971).
43
See R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, RIGHTS OF THE IMPRISONED: CASES, MATERIALS AND
DIRECTIONS 4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as SINGER & STATSKY].
14Id. See also T. WICKER, A TIME TO DIE 60 (1975).
45 See SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 43, at 4-5. De Tocqueville's visit was motivated
in part by a desire to see this new institution developed by Americans. See G. BEAUMONT
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As Europe was emulating the Pennsylvania approach,
however, American prisons were being reshaped according to a
system developed by a sadistic, entrepreneurial warden at the
Auburn Prison in New York.46 The Auburn system required
prisoners to work together in complete silence during the day
and return to isolated cells at night.4 7 The status of inmates sank
so low that by the late nineteenth century one court referred to
the prisoner as "for the time being the slave of the State. 48
Eventually, the Auburn system collapsed from the pressure of
anti-prison-industry legislation sponsored by unions fearing
competition from inmate labor. Prison administrators, searching
for new roles for their institutions, turned to the writings of late
nineteenth-century reformers such as Zebulon Brockway and
Dorothea Dix, who argued that criminals suffer from a social
"disease" that can be "cured" with proper treatment;49 America
almost immediately began to explore the possibilities of a
therapeutic approach to criminal justice. Although this "medical"
model of corrections has yet to be adopted fully or enthusiasti-
cally,5" no significant vestiges of the original Quaker impulse
remain in contemporary discussions of penal reform. When
more than a century ago religion lost its centrality to the pur-
pose of confinement, the inmate could no longer assume that
the institution would respect his freedom to pursue his religious
beliefs.
Nor, until recently, could the prisoner expect the courts to
recognize, let alone protect, his free exercise rights. For de-
cades, the federal courts consistently refused to hear prisoners'
complaints concerning administrative policies.5 1 This "hands-
off" doctrine,52 grounded in the policies of judicial restraint and
& A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
APPLICATION IN FRANCE 36 (S. Ill. Press ed. 1964) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1833).
46 
See SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 43, at 5. The warden, Elam Lynds, used cheap
prison labor to bestow favors upon his friends and associates.
4 7
1d.
48 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
4 9 
See SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 43, at 5.
5" Id. 5-6.
51 See, e.g., Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1965) ("It is settled doctrine
that except in extreme cases the courts may not interfere with the conduct of a prison,
with its regulations and their enforcement, or with its discipline."); Sostre v. McGinnis,
334 F.2d 906, 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964); United States ex rel.
Morris v. Radio Station WENR, 209 F.2d 105, 107 (7th Cir. 1953), overruled on other
grounds, Wartman v. Branch 7, Civil Div., County Court, 510 F.2d 130, 134 (7th Cir.
1975).
52 For a comprehensive treatment of the hands-off doctrine, see Note, Decency and
Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. REV. 841 (1971); Coin-
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deference to administrative expertise, 53 effectively precluded
supervision by judges of the prisons to which they regularly con-
signed convicted offenders. This judicial insensitivity is typified
by a frequently cited passage from a 1964 opinion denying a
Black Muslim inmate access to controversial religious literature:
"No romantic or sentimental view of constitutional rights or of
religion should induce a court to interfere with the necessary
disciplinary regime established by the prison officials. '54 This
overly deferential perspective was assumed, under the hands-off
approach, not only in cases presenting frivolous claims but also
in cases involving constitutional rights that the courts had previ-
ously acknowledged were retained by prisoners.
55
Among the earliest cases to erode the hands-off doctrine
were hybrid free exercise-equal protection claims brought by re-
ligious minority inmates. 56 Addressing the issue for the first
time, in Cooper v. Pate,57 the Supreme Court held that claims by
Black Muslims of religious suppression and discrimination stated
a federal cause of action. Similarly, in Cruz v. Beto,58 the Court
ruled that discriminatory disciplinary action against a Buddhist
inmate would violate both the first amendment guarantee of free
exercise of religion and the fourteenth amendment guarantee of
ment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of
Convicts, 72 YALE L. J. 506 (1963).
53 Separation of powers and federalism seem to underly the hands-off ar-
gument. Courts are said to be ill equipped for the factfinding necessary to
supervise prison administration, a task requiring investigative resources and
expertise. Consequently, courts defer to the decisions of those with expertise,
i.e., prison administrators. When dealing with state prisons, consideration of
federalism principles further restrains federal courts.
Comment, Backwash Benefits for Second Class Citizens: Prisoners' First Amendment and Pro-
cedural Due Process Rights, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 379 n.6 (1975).
-4 Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
'5 When fundamental rights were at stake, the courts created an exception to the
general policy of deference, and these occasional interventions led to the sketching of
an area of retained rights. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (access to the
courts); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam) (equal protection and free
exercise of religion). A classic statement of the retained rights theory can be found in
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945): "A
prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by neces-
sary implication, taken from him by law." Id. at 445. This principle was recently reaf-
firmed. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep't
of Correctional Servs., 529 F.2d 272, 275 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 94 (1976).
'6 See generally Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 985, 997-1001 (1962).
57 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
58 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). See generally State v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555,
566-68 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965) (discussing equal protection aspect of free exercise of
Muslim religion in prison).
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equal protection of the laws. In an oblique reference to the
hands-off doctrine, the Court stated:
Federal courts sit not to supervise prisons but to
enforce the constitutional rights of all "persons," includ-
ing prisoners. We are not unmindful that prison offi-
cials must be accorded latitude in the administration of
prison affairs, and that prisoners necessarily are subject
to appropriate rules and regulations. But persons in
prison, like other individuals, have the right to petition
the Government for redress of grievances which, of
course, includes "access of prisoners to the courts for
the purpose of presenting their complaints."59
This language suggests a long-overdue recognition of prisoners'
rights. ° Cruz v. Beto clearly establishes that the free exercise of
religion is among those rights retained by the incarcerated; no
positive scope, however, is delineated for that right.6 I Lower
courts, both before and after Cruz, have divided over the proper
resolution of the clash between the free exercise clause and the
demands of American penology, as the next several sections will
document.6 2 Yet a more active approach, suggested by the fol-
lowing language from a recent Fourth Circuit decision, is becom-
ing common:
While the judgments of prison officials are entitled to
considerable weight because they are based upon first-
hand observance of the events of prison life and upon a
certain expertise in the functioning of a penal institu-
59 405 U.S. at 321 (citations omitted).
61 "[Tjhe view once held that an inmate is a mere slave is now totally rejected. The
restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction entails do not place the citi-
zen beyond the ethical tradition that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth
of every individual." Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532, 2542 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701,
712 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974)). For an overview of this de-
velopment, see SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 43, at 511-608. On the procedural dimen-
sion of this issue, see Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section 1983, 57 GEO. L.J. 1270
(1969). See also Note, Enforcing Prisoners' Rights, 73 W. VA. L. REv. 38 (1971). For a
discussion of the internal procedures for hearing prisoner complaints see Gallington,
Prison Disciplinary Decisions, 60 J. CRIi. L.C. & P.S. 152 (1969); Lesnick, Grievance Proce-
dures in Federal Prisons: Practices and Proposals, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1974). See generally
Hirshkop, The Rights of Prisoners, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 451 (N. Dorsen ed.
1971); Zellick, Prisoners' Rights in England, 24 U. TORONTO L.J. 331 (1974).
61 One commentator has suggested that "under Cruz v. Beto freedom of religion
extends only as far as the umbrella of the equal protection clause can shelter it." Com-
ment, supra note 53, at 382 (footnote omitted).
62 See notes 64-142 infra & accompanying text.
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tion, prison officials are not judges. They are not
charged by law and constitutional mandate with the re-
sponsibility for interpreting and applying constitutional
provisions, and they are not always disinterested per-
sons in the resolution of prison problems. We do not
denigrate their views but we cannot be absolutely bound
by them.
63
B. A Survey of Major Issues
1. Diet
The Black Muslim religion, like Orthodox Judaism, pro-
hibits the consumption of pork or the essence of swine; accord-
ing to one Muslim minister, even "if our lives depend on it...
we can't eat pork. '64 Additionally, Black Muslims celebrate in
December the Fast of Ramadan, which entails the 'consumption,
after sunset and before sunrise, of ritually significant foods such
as Akbar coffee and pastries.65 The dietary requirements of
Muslim prisoners have led to friction between inmates and cor-
rections officials. Because of their low cost, pork and pork by-
products frequently appear on prison menus, sometimes to the
extent that an adequate nonpork diet is not available for the
abstaining inmate. Furthermore, the widespread use of pork as a
seasoning makes it difficult to isolate pork-free dishes. 66 Institu-
tional meals are served in a dining facility according to a strict
schedule that generally calls for dinner to be served before sun-
set; special arrangements for the proper celebration of the Fast
of Ramadan are rarely made.67 In addition, regulations prohibit-
ing food in prisoners' cells prevent Muslims from independently
observing Ramadan. 68 Prison administrators defend these
'3 Peyton v. Brown, 437 F.2d 1228, 1232 (4th Cir. 1971).
64 Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Although the Jewish
dietary laws of Kashruth are more restrictive than those of the Black Muslim faith, in
that they prescribe a particular mode of food preparation in addition to requiring the
nonconsumption of pork, a kosher Jew may, unlike a devout Muslim, violate the dietary
laws at a point just short of death. See United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687,
690-94 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
6;5 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1969); Cochran v.
Sielaff, 405 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (S.D. Ill. 1976).
66 On the use of pork in prison diets, see Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 419
(E.D. Okla. 1974).
67 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1969); Cochran v.
Sielaff, 405 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (S.D. Il1. 1976).
66 See, e.g., Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (S.D. Il. 1976).
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policies on the grounds of cost, convenience, and security.69
The judicial response to suits alleging unconstitutional inter-
ference with free exercise has been inconsistent. In the Ramadan
cases, the courts have deferred to administrative restrictions dis-
allowing, on security11 or expense grounds,71 requests for special
ritual foods and for changes in dining hours. Many of these
decisions have applied a compelling interest analysis.7 2 Muslim
requests for pork-free diets have been rejected because courts
have concluded that such requests seek "special privileges,' 73 be-
cause prison officials need only refrain from prohibiting religi-
ous practices and need not "provide the means for carrying
them out,"74 and because the existing prison diet supplies ade-
quate nourishment for Muslims abstaining from pork
consumption.7 5 The Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, in Barnett v. Rodgers,76 was more sympathetic to Mus-
lim requests for "one full-course pork-free diet once a day and
coffee three times daily":
Appellants do not seek, either for themselves or
other Muslims, a full menu tailored specially to their
religious beliefs. Their request . . .is essentially a plea
for a modest degree of official deference to their reli-
gious obligations. Certainly if this concession is feasi-
ble from the standpoint of prison management, it rep-
resents the bare minimum that jail authorities .. .are
constitutionally required to do, not only for Muslims,
69 See generally Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1969); Barnett v.
Rogers, 410 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
70 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 26 (5th Cir. 1969); Cochran v. Sielaff,
405 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (S.D. Ill. 1976).
7' See, e.g., Elam v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (semble), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 868 (1973); Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F. Supp. 1126, 1128 (S.D. Ill. 1976).
See also Clark v. Wolff, 347 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Neb.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Ander-
son v. Wolff, 468 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1972).
72 The compelling interest test will be carefully examined below, text accompanying
notes 279-357 infra, and expense will be rejected as a justification for abridgment of
free exercise rights, notes 324-25 infra & accompanying text.
,1 Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932
(1964).
74 Clark v. Wolff, 347 F. Supp. 887, 890 (D. Neb.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Ander-
son v. Wolff, 468 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1972).
75 Elam v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 582, 582 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 868 (1973); Abernathy v. Cunningham, 393 F.2d 775, 778 (4th Cir. 1968); Bryant
v. Carlson, 363 F. Supp. 928, 930-31 (E.D. I1. 1973); Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp.
687, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971).
76 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969); accord, SaMarion v. McGinnis, 35 App. Div. 2d
684, 314 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1970).
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but indeed for any group of inmates with religious re-
strictions on diet.
77
The case was remanded for a factual hearing to determine if
"compelling justifications" supported the infringement of free
exercise. 78 In one of the few decisions to reach the issue of
affirmative relief, a federal district court recently held that there
was no possible justification for failing to identify for Muslim
inmates those foods prepared with pork, and ordered the im-
mediate implementation of such a procedure. 9
The right of an incarcerated Orthodox Jew to a kosher diet
was upheld under a compelling interest analysis by the district
court in United States v. Kahane8" and under the Procunier v.
Martinez"l standard by the Second Circuit on appeal.8 2 On simi-
lar facts, however, the district court in United States v. Huss83
denied this asserted right. Applying a mere "reasonableness"
standard, 4 with the burden of proof on the inmate, the court
upheld the denial of kosher food, reasoning that "the expert
judgment of prison officials is accorded substantial deference
[especially] ... in regard to the basic matters involved in prison




Black Muslims are enjoined by their faith from shaving their
facial hair and thereby "resembling" women. This practice is
77 410 F.2d at 1001.
78 Id. at 1003.
79 Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 427, 436 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
81 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y.), affd sub nom. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d
Cir. 1975).
81 416 U.S. 396 (1974). The Court announced the following test:
First, the regulation or practice in question must further an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression.
Prison officials .. .must show that a regulation . . .furthers one or more of
the substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation.
Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than
is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental in-
terest involved.
Id. at 413. The Martinez test is discussed and rejected at notes 198-216 infra & accom-
panying text.
82 Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
83 394 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.
1975).
84 The reasonableness test is considered and rejected at notes 217-33 infra & ac-
companying text.
85 394 F. Supp. 752, 762 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 520 F.2d 598 (2d
Cir. 1975).
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based on the teaching of Allah, and conformity with it is
obligatory. 86 A parallel tenet of Orthodox Judaism requires
practitioners to wear beards, consistent with the Old Testament
law that "[y]e shall not round the corners of your heads, neither
shalt thou mar the corners of thy beard.18 7 Similarly, many
American Indian religious sects have traditionally required that
hair be worn long and braided.8 8 Although this practice is de-
rived from the general naturalism that has historically charac-
terized American Indian life, and is cultural as much as it is
religious, it has been held to be protected under the first
amendment.8 9 The American prison community also includes
individuals who purport to attach a private religious significance
to their hair length. 91'
Nearly all correctional institutions have regulations govern-
ing inmate appearance. 91 When these have been challenged on
free exercise grounds, prison officials have responded with three
justifications: 9' a) long hair and beards present security prob-
lems because they may be used to conceal weapons or con-
traband, b) long hair and beards hinder identification because a
prisoner's appearance could rapidly be altered, and c) long hair
and beards present hygiene problems because they are difficult
to keep clean. Most courts have upheld appearance regulations
on one or more of these grounds.93 The approach to inmate free
exercise challenges to hair requirements is typified by the state-
ment of the Fifth Circuit in Brooks v. Wainwright:94 "[W]here the
16 M. Sayed Adly, About the Beard of Muslims 1 (sermon) (1976).
s7 Leviticus 19:27. See also Numbers 6:5.
8 See Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), aff'd sub nom.
Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
8 9ld. at 156.
") See, e.g., Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970) (divine revelation
commanded plaintiff inmate not to shave); Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376 (5th
Cir. 1970) (prisoner alleged that he was "an offspring of a God and a Mortal," and that
mustache was gift from Creator).
9" See, e.g., Teterud v. Gillman, 385 F. Supp. 153, 154 (S.D. Iowa 1974), aff'd sub
noma. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975) ("Hair length may grow to the shirt
collar, and bottom on [sic] the ears. May grow over the ears if desired.").
"2 See generally Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976); Maguire v. Wil-
kinson, 405 F. Supp. 637 (D. Conn. 1975).
91 See, e.g., Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Wain-
wright, 419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Goings v. Aaron, 350 F.
Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972). Many of these cases also involve assertions of a penumbral
free speech or privacy right to wear long hair or a beard; these claims have usually
been rejected on the security, identification, and hygiene rationales. See, e.g., Rhinehart
v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd per curiam, 491 F.2d 705 (8th Cir.
1974). Circuit Judge Lay's dissenting opinion in Rhinehart is a convincing critique of this
line of authority. 491 F.2d at 706-07 (dissenting opinion).
94 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970).
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state regulation is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, the courts
will not interfere with the administrative functions of state
prisons." 95 Finding the appearance regulation to be promotive of
"cleanliness and . . . personal identification,' '9 6 the Brooks court
rejected the plaintiff's claim. Only the Eighth Circuit, in Teterud
v. Burns,97 has explicitly invalidated a prison's appearance regu-
lation on free exercise grounds, applying a least drastic means
test:
98
The proof at trial established that the legitimate
institutional needs of the penitentiary can be served by
viable, less restrictive means which will not unduly bur-
den the administrator's task. The challenged regulation,
thus, impermissibly infringed on Teterud's right under
the First Amendment to the free exercise of his
religion. 99
Other courts have upheld prisoners' free exercise claims, but the
cases rest on equal protection principles rather than on the first
amendment.'
3. Segregation
Prison administrators often place inmates in segregation
units for punitive purposes, and infrequently do so for protec-
tive purposes. Prisoners in segregation generally receive little or
no religious visitation and are excluded from participation in
group worship."" Because group worship is practiced by certain
faiths, these policies may deprive an inmate of "refreshment to
the soul."'" 2 The courts have frequently upheld, on the grounds
of security and convenience, regulations denying segregated in-
9 d. at 653.
96 1d. (quoting Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1370, 1372 (5th Cir. 1970)).
97 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975).
98 The least drastic means test is evaluated at notes 331-42 infra & accompanying
text.
99 522 F.2d at 362-63. See generally Maguire v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 637 (D.
Conn. 1975).
""' See, e.g., Maguire v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 637 (D. Conn. 1975) (regulation
permitting prisoners to wear beards based on religious conviction, only if they wore
beards when incarcerated, impermissibly presumed that religious beliefs assertedly ac-
quired after incarceration are spurious); People ex rel. Rockey v. Krueger, 62 Misc. 2d
135, 306 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (Muslims cannot be punished for refusal to
shave while Orthodox Jews are permitted to wear beards).
'" See Collins v. Vitek, 375 F. Supp. 856, 862 (D.N.H. 1974); SINGER & STATSKY,
supra note 43, at 666.
102 Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232, 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
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mates the rights to receive ministerial visits,0 3 to conduct group
worship services within the segregation area, 114 and to attend
group worship services with the general prison population.'? In
Sharp v. Sigler,0 6 the leading case in this area, four prisoners in
segregation brought free exercise and equal protection chal-
lenges to the denial of their requests to attend prison chapel
services. The Eighth Circuit, speaking through Judge Blackmun,
addressed the free exercise claim and rejected petitioners' least
drastic means argument, holding that
the measure and comparison of security risks as be-
tween alternative procedures are matters appropriate
for resolution by the prison authorities ....
The standard is one of reasonableness. This record
demonstrates for us that under all the circumstances the
defendant warden's actions were not unreasonable....
We see nothing arbitrary, in the constitutional sense
107
The equal protection argument-that more dangerous inmates
had in the past been permitted to leave segregation units for
weekly group worship-also was rejected, 1118 although a similar
equal protection claim had previously been upheld by the Eighth
Circuit in Konigsberg v. Ciccone.1' 9
One recent case, Wilson v. Beame,1n 1 reached a different re-
sult on the free exercise issue. Employing a compelling interest
analysis, the court found the prison interest in security to be
compelling, but held that less drastic means than a total prohibi-
103 See Mims v. Shapp, 399 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (semble), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 541 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976).
104 See id.
"5 See, e.g., LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 878 (1973); Mims v. Shapp, 399 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1975), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 541 F.2d 415 (3d Cir. 1976); Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406 F.
Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pretrial detainees); United States ex rel. Cleggett v. Pate,
229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d
881 (App. Div. 1957). See also Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224 (D.N.J. 1976).
1,6 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969).
1 07 Id. at 971.
1 0 Id. at 972.
9 285 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 417 F.2d 161 (8th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963 (1970) (where Catholics and Protestants in segregation
were provided with escorts enabling them to worship with the general population,
members of other faiths must be provided the same opportunity).
11) 380 F. Supp. 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (Weinstein, J.); cf. United States ex rel. Jones
v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1971) (compelling justification required for forbidding
an untried detainee confined to solitary from attending group services). See also Mitchell
v. Untreiner, 421 F. Supp. 886, 895 (N.D. Fla. 1976).
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tion of group worship by segregated pretrial detainees
were available. The court ordered the provision of additional
guards in order to allow the petitioner to worship with the gen-
eral prison community. Another district court rejected the Wilson
v. Beame remedy, but ordered that segregated inmates be al-
lowed to hold group worship services in the prison's dayroom."'
4. Ministers
The right of prisoners to receive counseling visits from, and
to correspond with, outside ministers of their faith has been
widely recognized by the courts,"12 even in cases involving Mus-
lim ministers who, as former inmates, would otherwise be ineli-
gible to visit under the regulations of some prison systems. One
court has upheld a prison ban on an inmate minister's distribu-
tion of religious literature within the institution."13 The question
of under what circumstances prison officials must provide
facilities and clergy is essentially one of equal protection. 1 4 In
Cruz v. Beto, 1 5 the Supreme Court noted that "[a] special
chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith
regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest or minister be
provided without regard to the extent of the demand."' 1 6 One
court held that on the facts before it equal protection did not
require that Jewish inmates be provided with a rabbi;"17 another
has found the facts to call for providing a Muslim minister.'"
5. Other Religious Issues
Imprisoned practitioners of most religious groups are
" See Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (pretrial de-
tainees).
112 Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518
(7th Cir. 1967); Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974);
Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd on other grounds, 435 F.2d
1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971). But see Fallis v. United States, 476
F.2d 619, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1973) (upholding refusal of prison authorities to permit
counseling visits by a Mormon elder and his family); Coleman v. District of Columbia
Comm'rs, 234 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Va. 1964).
The issue of visits to prisoners in segregation is discussed in cases cited note 103
supra & accompanying text.
113 McLaughlin v. Cunningham, 344 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Va. 1972).
H4 See, e.g., Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962) (government
required to make religious facilities available in nondiscriminatory manner).
112 405 U.S. 319 (1972).
116Id. at 322 n.2.
11 Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970).
n8 Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (semble), affd on other
grounds, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971).
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routinely allowed to hold group worship ceremonies. Members
of certain controversial faiths, however, have on occasion been
denied the right to group worship, usually for security reasons.
When challenged under the free exercise guarantee, such de-
nials frequently have been invalidated. In a widely cited opinion,
the court in Knuckles v. Prasse"1 9 reluctantly applied the clear and
present danger test 12 to a total ban on Muslim group worship.
The court found no such danger and ordered that Muslims be
allowed to hold collective services, warning, however, that "[i]f
... the Muslim gatherings in prison proceed along non-religious
lines-if defiance of prison or civil authority becomes the mes-
sage and substance of such gatherings-the prison authorities
may cancel the collective worship."12' Another district court re-
cently ordered prison officials to permit Muslim group worship,
holding that there was no justification at all for the denial to do
so. 122 One of the few cases rejecting a free exercise challenge of
this kind is Kennedy v. Meacham,123 in which the court, applying
the reasonableness test, held that prison officials could prohibit
practitioners of the "Satanic religion" from congregating for
worship ceremonies involving bells, candles, pointing sticks,
gongs, incense, black robes, and the "baphomet," a symbol of
Satan. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit vacated and
remanded this decision for an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether the restrictions on free exercise rights were justified by
a compelling state interest.
Prohibitions on wearing religious medallions have been up-
held on the grounds that such medals might serve as weapons.
1 24
Any regulation, of course, must comport with equal protection
standards; thus, permitting Catholic crosses but not Muslim cres-
cents has been held unjustified.
125
Several problems peculiar to Muslims have arisen. The Law
of Islam compels Sunni Muslims to perform their prayers five
times a day at fixed hours, standing, bowing, and prostrating;
"without any one of these forms the prayers (Salat) would be
119 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971).
'2" For an evaluation of this test, see notes 174-90 infra & accompanying text.
121 302 F. Supp. at 1058.
122 Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 427 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
123 382 F. Supp. 996 (D. Wyo. 1974), vacated and remanded, 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir.
1976).
124 See, e.g., Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971).
125 State ex rel. Tate v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965).
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incomplete."1 26 The tightly scheduled prison routine sometimes
interferes with Muslim praying, and a few free exercise cases
have been brought on the basis of such interference. In the only
case reaching the merits, the court found no deprivation of re-
ligious liberty, because the prison routine, although rigidly
scheduled, allowed ample opportunity for prayer. 12 7 The Mus-
lim religion also requires that the head be kept covered with a
prayer hat. "These hats 'not only serve as . . . a garment for
prayer' but also are 'an intricate part' of the Muslim Faith.' 128 In
the unreported free exercise case of Abdullah v. Manson, 29 the
court struck down under compelling interest analysis a prison
regulation restricting head coverings for security purposes. The
prison policy of asking each inmate upon arrival to designate a
religious preference presents another almost uniquely Muslim
problem. This preference often severely restricts the prisoner's
ability to attend other religious ceremonies. Because many Mus-
lims undergo their conversion to this faith while in prison, and
because prisoners often are not allowed to change their pref-
erential designation,131 the courts in some cases have ordered
that prisoners be permitted to attend meetings of religions other
than the one listed on the entrance card.1 3 '
6. Literature
The study of religious literature is important to most faiths.
Access to such literature has sometimes been withheld from
prisoners, particularly Black Muslims, through passive refusal by
corrections officials to furnish copies of particular works for the
prison library 32 as well as through active suppression of al-
legedly "inflammatory" materials that prisoners sought to pro-
cure on their own.' 33 In the cases involving active suppression of
126 Brief for Appellants at 2, Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976)
(quoting Appendix at 6).
127 Bethea v. Daggett, 329 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ga. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 444 F.2d
112 (5th Cir. 1971).
128 Brief for Appellants at 3, Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976)
(quoting Appendix at 6) (citation omitted).
129 No. 15,606 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 1973).
130 See, e.g., Long v. Katzenbach, 258 F. Supp. 89 (M.D. Pa. 1966). See also Maguire
v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 637 (D. Conn. 1975).
131 See, e.g., SaMarion v. McGinnis, 55 Misc. 2d 59, 284 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct.
1967). But see Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Ill. 1976).
132 See, e.g., Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971).
103 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Long v. Parker, 390
F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968).
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the Muslim newspaper, Muhammad Speaks, and other writings of
Elijah Muhammad, most courts have required prison authorities
to show a high degree of justification to support the rule.
34
While some courts have applied a variant of the compelling in-
terest test-the leading case of Brown v. Peyton135 articulated the
necessity of "a convincing showing that paramount state interests
... require" the restriction of an inmate's free exercise-other
courts have employed a "substantial interference" test 36 or a test
requiring that the suppressed material be "inflammatory."'
3 7
Perhaps the most widely used test is that of "clear and present
danger," under which suppression is rarely permitted:
Mere antipathy caused by statements derogatory of,
and offensive to the white race is not sufficient to justify
the suppression of religious literature even in a prison.
Nor does the mere speculation that such statements
may ignite racial or religious riots in a penal institution
warrant their proscription. To justify the prohibition of
religious literature, the prison officials must prove that
the literature creates a clear and present danger of a
breach of prison security or discipline or some other
substantial interference with the orderly functioning of
the institution.'
38
Suppression is almost never allowed under these standards.
One of the very few cases in this area in which a court held
that the state met its heavy burden is Knuckles v. Prasse.'39 After
finding that the works of Elijah Muhammad "could be inter-
preted as an endorsement of a concept that whites generally and
prison authorities should be defied by Muslim prisoners,"'141 the
court ruled that prison authorities need not make the materials
available.
Analysis of the religious literature cases is complicated by
the overlap between the first amendment's free speech and free
131 See, e.g., Hoggro v. Pontesso, 456 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1972); Rowland v. Sigler,
327 F. Supp. 821 (D. Neb.), aff'd, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Pitts v.
Knowles, 339 F. Supp. 1183 (W.D. Wis. 1972), aff'd, 478 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1973).
135 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971).
136 See, e.g., Northern v. Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd on other
grounds, 448 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971). For a critique of the substantial interference
test, see notes 191-97 infra & accompanying text.
131 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969).
"I Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 1968).
139 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971).
140 Id. at 1040.
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exercise guarantees. Most nonprison cases involving this overlap
have been treated as free speech cases. 141 The prison cases have
not displayed the same consistent approach, however; indeed,
the question does not seem to have been addressed directly at
all.'
42
C. The Major Nonprison Free Exercise Cases
Until 1963, the Supreme Court had not squarely resolved a
major free exercise case in favor of the individual. 143 Plaintiffs
asserting religious rights prevailed before the Court only when
their claims implicated the first amendment guarantee of free
speech as well as that of free exercise; 144 cases brought under the
religion clause alone were unsuccessful. 45 Braunfeld v. Brown,
146
a 1961 Sunday closing law case that involved the prosecution of
Orthodox Jews under a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting retail
sales on Sundays, was the most recent major free exercise case
141 See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (re-
fusal by Jehovah's Witness school children to salute flag held unpunishable expression);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (anti-Catholic public speech of Jehovah's
Witness held protected). Although these cases "could properly have been adjudicated
under the free exercise clause because of the religious motivation of the individuals
involved, they were decided on free speech grounds, as the courts and commentators
have fairly uniformly noted." Marcus, The Forum of Conscience: Applying Standards Under
the Free Exercise Clause, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1217, 1265 (footnote omitted). Most of the
mixed speech-religion cases reached the result that appears mandated by free exercise
analysis. Cf. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (equal access to public parks
ordered for Jehovah's Witnesses); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (same).
But see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (affirming conviction of Witness for
allowing nine-year-old niece to sell pamphlets in public, despite assertion that distribu-
tion of literature was required religious practice).
142 See, e.g., Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968) (indiscriminate use of free
speech and free exercise standards in evaluating suppression of Muhammad Speaks). In
cases involving only the free speech guarantee, the courts have almost uniformly pre-
vented prison officials from withholding publications that an inmate has purchased or
otherwise obtained; incoming materials may be inspected, however, for contraband,
obscenity, or "clear and present danger." See, e.g., Frazier v. Donelon, 381 F. Supp. 911
(E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1975) (prison ban on Playboy Magazine
upheld on grounds of internal order); Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F. Supp. 395 (W.D. Mo.
1973); Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265 (D.N.H. 1972); Fortune Society v.
McGinnis, 319 F. Supp. 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also I N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B.
NEUBORNE, EMERSON, HABER AND DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1338-39 (4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as DORSEN, BENDER & NEUBORNE]. For
a discussion of what is the proper analysis of a mixed speech and religion case, see
notes 184-88 infra & accompanying text.
143 For a discussion of free exercise litigation generally, see DORSEN, BENDER &
NEUBORNE, supra note 142, at 1166-1279; L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE
CONSTITUTION 31-36 (1975).
144 See note 141 supra.
' 45 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (prohibition of polygamy
applied to Mormons).
146 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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resolved in favor of the state. As a Sabbatarian, Braunfeld was
unable to conduct business on Saturday. Sunday closing, he ar-
gued, would "result in impairing [his] ability ... to earn a liveli-
hood and render [him] unable to continue in his business.'
'1 47
Putting him to a choice between "his religious faith and his
economic survival ,' 148 Braunfeld maintained, amounted to un-
constitutional interference with his free exercise rights.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument. Chief Justice
Warren, writing for a plurality, 49 characterized the burden on
petitioner as "indirect" because the state law did not prohibit the
religious practice, and held that the closing law would be invalid
only if "the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do
not impose such a burden."''5 " No alternative means of further-
ing the state's goal-"one day of the week apart from the others
as a day of rest, repose, recreation, and tranquility" 5 '-was
found. A suggested alternative, exempting Sabbatarians from
the statute, was rejected because it "might well undermine the
State's goal of providing a day that, as best possible, eliminates
the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity."' 52 Chief Jus-
tice Warren found other difficulties with an exemption, includ-
ing the delicate inquiry into a Sabbatarian's religious sincerity
that it would entail, and the Court affirmed Braunfeld's convic-
tion.
Justice Brennan wrote the principal free exercise dissent,
asking "[w]hat overbalancing need is so weighty in the constitu-
tional scale that it justifies this substantial, though indirect, lim-
itation of appellants' freedom?" Justice Brennan answered his
own question:
It is the mere convenience of having everyone rest on
the same day. It is to defend this interest that the Court
holds that a State need not follow the alternative route
of granting an exemption for those who in good faith
observe a day of rest other than Sunday.
1 53
Arguing that the state should be required to grant an exemption
to religious individuals like Braunfeld, as twenty-one of the
147 Id. at 601.
Id. at 616 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
j49justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in the result only. Id. at 610.
'51 Id. at 607.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 608.
153 Id. at 614.
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
thirty-four states that had Sunday closing laws had done, Justice
Brennan thought the objection that such an exemption "would
make Sundays a little noisier, and the task of police and pros-
ecutor a little more difficult"'154 to be less than compelling. The
other problems discussed by the Chief Justice were "more fanci-
ful than real" to Justice Brennan, 155 who pointed out that in-
quiries into religious sincerity had been expressly upheld by the
Court in United States v. Ballard.
56
The Braunfeld reasoning, though not technically overruled,
was not followed two years later in Justice Brennan's opinion for
the Court in Sherbert v. Verner.'5 7 Adell Sherbert, a Seventh Day
Adventist, was fired because she would not work on Saturday,
the Sabbath of her church. Unable to find other employment
that did not require Saturday work, she filed for state unem-
ployment compensation benefits. Her claim was refused on the
ground that by adhering to her Sabbatarianism she had made
herself unavailable for work. Justice Brennan began his opinion
by stating that although the burden on free exercise imposed in
Sherbert was, like that in Braunfeld, "indirect," "[i]t is basic that no
showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
'[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give
occasion for permissible limitation.' ",158 No such abuse had been
advanced here; the only state interest raised in defense of Ms.
Sherbert's exclusion was the possibility that "the filing of fraud-
ulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious ob-
jections to Saturday work might not only dilute the unemploy-
ment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by
employers of necessary Saturday work." 59 Justice Brennan dis-
missed this contention, both because the argument had not been
presented to the lower court and because the contention did not
appear supportable on the record. Given the holding that no
compelling state interest had been shown, Justice Brennan did
not have to reach the less drastic means question, but he
nevertheless stressed that if the Court had found a paramount
interest endangered, the state would then have had to demon-
strate that "no alternative forms of regulation would combat
1
5 4 Id.
15 5 Id. at 615.
156 322 U.S. 78 (1944). For a discussion considering the significance of the Ballard
decision, see note 306 infra.
157 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
"" Id. at 406 (quoting in part Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
159 Id. at 407.
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such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.' 16" Jus-
tice Stewart, concurring in the result, and Justices Harlan and
White dissenting, thought that the majority's holding was incon-
sistent with Braunfeld. As Justice Harlan observed, "any differ-
ences between this case and Braunfeld cut against the present
appellant." 161 The Sherbert majority, however, discussed Braun-
feld as if it were still good law.
In the most recent free exercise case, Wisconsin v. Yoder,1
6 2
the Court addressed a first amendment challenge by Old Order
Amish parents to Wisconsin's compulsory education law, and
reaffirmed the protective attitude it displayed in Sherbert,
prompting one commentator to suggest that free exercise has
become, in the short time since Braunfeld, the most cherished
constitutional liberty. 163 The Yoders were members of an ex-
tremely conservative Mennonite group who earn their livelihood
exclusively by farming or related activities, wear seventeenth-
century-style clothing and untrimmed beards, abstain from using
electricity and other technological developments, and believe
that salvation requires a life apart from worldly influences. The
Amish accept formal education through the eighth grade, but
reject further schooling as promotive of values-such as com-
petitiveness, success, and social life-that are antithetical to tradi-
tional Amish values.
Wisconsin asserted two general interests in requiring that all
children attend school up to the age of sixteen. The first was the
Jeffersonian argument that compulsory public education pre-
pares citizens to discharge their political responsibilities in a
democratic society and support themselves economically with-
out becoming a burden on the community. The second was the
development of individuals able to support themselves in soci-
ety-the protection, especially, of children who might some day
wish to enter the secular world but would be unprepared to do
so if they had been sequestered by their parents. The Court, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, rejected both state interests
and overturned Yoder's conviction as unconstitutional. Chief
Justice Burger apparently applied the compelling interest test,
because Wisconsin was required to demonstrate a state goal of
"the highest order." 16 4 Furthermore, generalized assertions of
160 Id. (footnote omitted).
161 Id. at 421 (Harlan & White, JJ., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
162 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
163 See Pfeffer, supra note 20, at 1140.
164 406 U.S. at 215; see note 166 infra.
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a paramount need for an educated populace would not suffice:
"Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake...
we cannot accept such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted
validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine
the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement
for compulsory education .. . . 65 The Chief Justice concluded
that neither of Wisconsin's interests was "of sufficient magnitude
to override the interests claiming protection under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause."'166 There were no dissents from this conclusion.
67
III. AN EVALUATION OF THE PRINCIPAL TESTS
The law of free exercise of religion in prison is marked not
only by the inconsistent results previously discussed, 68 but also
by the application of inconsistent standards in arriving at those
results. Different courts apply different tests to essentially similar
facts, and occasionally one court applies several different tests to
the facts of a single case. 69 Thus, in Goodwin v. Oswald 'a7 the
Second Circuit held that a prison regulation abridging first
amendment rights is constitutional if it is justified by "a compel-
ling state interest centering about prison security, or a clear and
present danger of a breach of prison security ... or some substan-
tial interference with orderly institutional administration."''
Seven distinct tests can be identified in the cases and the law
review literature: 1) the clear and present danger test; 2) the
"'406 U.S. at 221.
I6 6 d. at 214. Although Chief Justice Burger appeared to require a compelling
interest, the Court's opinion may also be read as applying an ad hoc balancing test. For
a discussion and resolution of this ambiguity, see notes 293-342 infra & accompanying
text.
1 Justice Douglas strongly hinted that there may be a constitutional interest of the
Amish children sufficient to overcome the parents' free exercise claim. 406 U.S. at 241
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part). The Yoder litigation is considered in Marcus, supra note
141, at 1225-30; Pfeffer, supra note 20, at 1139-42; Comment, The Amish and Compulsory
School Attendance: Recent Developments, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 832; 56 MINN. L. REv. 111
(1971); 24 VAND. L. REV. 808 (1971).
'
68 
See text accompanying notes 64-142 supra.
169See, e.g., Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224, 1238 (D.N.J. 1976) (compelling
interest and clear and present danger tests); Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F. Supp. 871, 877
(N.D. Cal. 1975) (compelling interest, clear and present danger, and reasonableness
tests).
The same confusion may be found in the commentaries. E.g., Hollen, supra note
34, at 18-19 (clear and present danger and balancing tests advocated); Comment,
Prisoners' Rights: Restrictions on Religious Practices, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 387 (1970) (clear
and present danger and substantial interference tests advocated).
17" 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972).
17 Id. at 1244 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Fortune Soc'y v. McGinnis, 319 F.
Supp. 901, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (Weinfeld, J.)).
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substantial interference test; 3) the Procunier v. Martinez17 2 test;
4) the reasonableness test; 5) the ad hoc balancing test; 6) the
Braunfeld v. Brown1 7 3 test; and 7) the compelling interest test.
Three of these were originally articulated in nonprison free
speech cases: the clear and present danger test, the substantial
interference test, and the Procunier v. Martinez test. Two are not
widely accepted in the nonprison context in either the free
speech or the free exercise cases: the reasonableness test and the
ad hoc balancing test. Finally, two are "general" free exercise
tests that have been applied in the nonprison context as well: the
compelling interest test and the Braunfeld v. Brown test. This
section of the Comment will analyze and evaluate each of the
seven tests and conclude that the compelling interest test is the
most appropriate standard for resolving prisoners' free exercise
claims.
A. The Clear and Present Danger Test
The clear and present danger test is frequently applied in
prison free exercise cases. 17 4 As articulated in Banks v. Ha-
vener, '7 5 one of the earliest decisions to adopt this approach,
the test requires that "[t]o justify the prohibition of the practice
of an established religion . .. the prison officials must prove by
satisfactory evidence that the teachings and practice of the sect
create a clear and present danger to the orderly functioning of
the institution.1' 76 The use of this test in the free exercise con-
text is generally supported by a citation to Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut,1 77 in which the Supreme Court overturned the conviction
of a Jehovah's Witness for distributing anti-Catholic literature in
a heavily Catholic neighborhood. Many of the prison free ex-
ercise cases, like Cantwell, that have applied this test involved
efforts to prevent the distribution of religious literature.17 8 Noth-
ing in the opinions, however, suggests that the courts intended
to confine the test to free exercise cases that also implicate the
free speech guarantee of the first amendment, and several courts
have applied the clear and present danger standard to non-
speech free exercise issues such as a prohibition on group wor-
172 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
173 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion).
1, E.g., cases cited note 179 infra.
175 234 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Va. 1964).
176Id. at 30.
177 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
178 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Long v. Parker, 390
F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967).
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ship. 179
This approach has been endorsed by several commentators.
At least two have concluded that this test should be widely ap-
plied in prison free exercise cases, because the fundamental issue
in all such cases is institutional security and the clear and present
danger test is directly responsive to this issue. 18' Other commen-
tators, however, have suggested that the test should be limited to
cases in which the prison authorities' immediate interest is disci-
pline or prison security.' 81
Two considerations, however, counsel against adopting this
test. First, the clear and present danger test was developed in the
free speech context as a response to the attempted suppression
of opinions "fraught with death."' 82 To transfer the test to the
free exercise context, as some courts have done, is to strain it
severely, for many free exercise issues simply will not admit of
proper clear and present danger analysis. In the kosher food
cases considered earlier, 183 for example, a court applying this
test would presumably inquire whether the provision of kosher
food to Orthodox Jewish inmates would constitute a clear and
present danger to convenient and economical administration of
the prison. A court would be obliged to decide free exercise
cases based on whether the values of convenience or economy
are endangered, an approach that would entail giving great
weight to the number of prisoners in the institution asserting a
particular claim or type of claim (with its attendant cost and
inconvenience). Yet for the state's burden of justification to be
reduced as the number of persons affected by a given restriction
increases is surely irrational. Moreover, the determination of
when economical and convenient administration is endangered
would be standardless and could lead to an unjustified degree of
deference to prison officials. Nor is the test appropriate in cases
in which the state asserts a security interest in, for example,
a prohibition on beards. The essence of the prison officials' po-
'79 Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224, 1238 (D.N.J. 1976); Lipp v. Procunier, 395
F. Supp. 871, 877 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (semble); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036,
1056 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936
(1971) ("[i]t is irrelevant whether the danger to prison operations is caused by religious
literature or by the practice of religion").
180 Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: Of Muslim Rites and Constitutional Rights, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1488, 1503-04 (1962).
"'1 Hollen, supra note 34, at 18-19 (balancing test for nonsecurity cases); Comment,
supra note 169, at 395 (substantial interference test for nonsecurity cases).
182 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See
G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054-68 (9th ed. 1975).
183 Text accompanying notes 64-85 supra.
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sition is that because contraband can be hidden in a beard
and remain undetected, the beard carries a potential for dan-
ger to prison security. Only the broadest reading of "present"
could, under this test, justify a requirement that beards be kept
trimmed. In short, in the free exercise context, the clear and pres-
ent danger test appears to be insufficiently restrictive when the
challenged regulation is based on security and inevitably arbi-
trary when the regulation is based on economy or convenience.
Cases that present overlapping free speech and free exercise
issues, however, require a different analysis. When a prison free
exercise claim is directed against the content-based suppression
of speech, the clear and present danger test is appropriate.1 4 In
some of the earliest cases involving Black Muslims, for example,
prison officials, fearful that the sect would teach defiance of civil
authority, denied Muslim inmates all forms of group worship
and cut off access to religious literature and ministerial visits.
185
Suppression based on the ideas communicated by a religious
group is properly evaluated under the clear and present danger
test as interpreted in Brandenburg v. Ohio,'8 6 for the religious
advocacy of defiance in prison is entitled to no less constitutional
protection than that accorded to the violent "revengeance"'
87
communicated in Brandenburg. The state's greater interest in
maintaining order in the prison context" argues for allowing
suppression on a lesser showing of "imminent lawless action"'
88
' 4 See generally Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). Although Professor Ely has rejected the traditional distinc-
tion between content suppression and time, place, and manner regulation as "shop-
worn" and "as irrelevant as it is unintelligible," Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482,
1497-98 (1975), the distinction still appears in Supreme Court analysis, see, e.g., Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2440, 2449-50, 2453 & n.35 (1976); id. at
2459-61 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and retains its conceptual significance. See S. KRANTZ,
R. BELL, J. BRANT & M. MAGRUDER, MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS ON PRISONERS'
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES rule IA-lc (1973) (advocating clear and present danger
test for content-based regulation).
The content-manner distinction should not be confused with the belief-practice dis-
tinction of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Mormon polygamy case.
For an isolated recent endorsement of the latter distinction, see Comment, Religious
Freedom in Prison-Free Exercise vs. The Need for Prison Security, 36 ALB. L. REV. 416
(1972).
185 E.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892
(1964); Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 1255 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 936 (1971).
186 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). See generally Fox, The First Amendment Rights of
Prisoners, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 162, 176-78 (1972).
187 395 U.S. at 446.
188 Id. at 447.
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than was required in Brandenburg, but not for applying a differ-
ent test.
The second consideration that weighs against applying the
clear and present danger test in most prison free exercise cases is
that, with the possible exception of Cantwell v. Connecticut,'"9 this
test has not been applied in the nonprison free exercise
context.'9 1 For reasons that will be developed in part III-G,
whichever test is applied in the nonprison cases should be ap-
plied in the prison cases as well. Therefore, any other test, in-
cluding the clear and present danger test, would be inappro-
priate.
B. The Substantial Interference Test
The substantial interference test originated in a line of cases
involving the first amendment rights of public school students.
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,'91
the leading case in this area, the Supreme Court held that stu-
dents could not be forbidden to wear black armbands in class
absent a showing that such conduct would "materially and sub-
stantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate disci-
pline in the operation of the school."' 92 All nine Justices viewed
Tinker as a free speech case; none of the five opinions filed in
Tinker mentioned the free exercise guarantee. 93 Several courts,
however, have applied the substantial interference test to free
exercise claims raised by prisoners, 94 and at least one commen-
tator has endorsed this approach.
195
Assuming that this is the appropriate test for public school
free speech cases, it nevertheless should not be transferred to the
189 310 U.S. 296, 308, 310 (1940).
' 9" But see Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937, 938 (4th Cir. 1943) (semble); Shel-
don v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 773-74 (D. Ariz. 1963) (dictum); State ex rel. Swann v.
Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975) (semble), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
191 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
1921 Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Bayars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). See
also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972) (dictum).
193 393 U.S. at 504 (majority opinion); id. at 514 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 515
(White, J., concurring); id. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing).
194E.g., Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816, 822 (3d Cir. 1968) (semble); Northern v.
Nelson, 315 F. Supp. 687, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 448 F.2d 1266
(9th Cir. 1971).
195 "It is proposed that the proper standard for testing restrictions in this area is
'substantial interference,' and that courts should not permit any restrictions unless the
prison can clearly demonstrate that a religious practice left unrestricted would effec-
tively nullify an essential prison interest." Comment, supra note 169, at 399 (footnotes
omitted).
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prison free exercise context. First, this test has never been ap-
plied in a nonprison free exercise case, and there is no justifica-
tion for treating prisoners' claims under a standard different
from the general free exercise standard. 196 Second, the infre-
quent application of the substantial interference test to free ex-
ercise cases,1 97 together with the ambiguity inherent in the term
"substantial," makes it difficult to predict the extent to which this
test would protect prisoners' religious liberty. These considera-
tions illustrate the problems that arise when free speech doc-
trines are transferred to the free exercise context.
C. The Procunier v. Martinez Test
The plaintiff inmates in Procunier v. Martinez9 8 challenged,
on free speech and other grounds, prison regulations that au-
thorized opening and reading inmate mail to detect violations of
an elaborate set of rules, under which prisoners were forbidden
to "agitate, unduly complain, magnify grievances, or behave in
any way which might lead to violence."' 99 A three-judge district
court held that the mail censorship program was unconstitu-
tional,'2 "'° and the Supreme Court affirmed without dissent.
201
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, rested the decision on the
free speech rights of the prisoners' correspondents rather than
on the rights of the prisoners themselves.2' 2 In an effort to ac-
commodate both the prison officials' concerns and the corre-
spondents' rights, Justice Powell relied heavily on United States
v. O'Brien2113 and fashioned a two-part test:
First, the regulation or practice in question must fur-
ther an important or substantial governmental interest
unrelated to the suppression of expression. Prison of-
ficials ... must show that a regulation ... furthers one
"6 See text accompanying notes 251-71 infra.
"7 The test has been widely used in public school free speech cases. DORSEN,
BENDER & NEUBORNE, supra note 142, at 882-83. In the few public school free exercise
cases, however, the courts have used other tests. E.g., Spence v. Bailey, 465 F.2d 797
(6th Cir. 1972) (compelling interest test); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974)
(same) (semble); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963) (clear and present
danger test) (semble). The only application of the substantial interference test to free
exercise issues has occurred in the prison cases.
98 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
191 Id. at 399 n.2.
21," Martinez v. Procunier, 354 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (per curiam), aff'd,
416 U.S. 396 (1974).
2,' Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
2112 Id. at 408-09. The Court's opinion characterized the issue of correspondents'
rights as a "narrower" ground of decision. Id. at 408.
203 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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or more of the substantial governmental interests of
security, order, and rehabilitation. Second, the limita-
tion of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the
particular governmental interest involved. Thus a re-
striction . . . that furthers an important or substantial
interest of penal administration will nevertheless be in-
valid if its sweep is unnecessarily broad.2 4
Under this test, the Court held the mail censorship program to
be unconstitutional. Several lower courts have applied this test in
cases involving the free speech rights of prisoners themselves
205
and, more importantly, in cases involving prisoners' free exercise
claims.2 11
6
The Martinez standard is not free from difficulty. It derives
largely from United States v. O'Brien,217 in which the Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction of an antiwar protestor who pub-
licly burned his draft card. The O'Brien test, also known as the
incidental restrictions test,21°8 is based on the assumption that
certain laws are directed primarily at an unprotected activity and
only incidentally restrict the asserted constitutional right. In
O'Brien, the Court recognized two distinct elements in the card
burning: a nonspeech element that was the target of the statute
and a speech element upon which there was an incidental effect.
This distinction has generally been viewed as being without sub-
stance, and the O'Brien decision has been criticized for this
reason;2 119 thus, the source of the Martinez test is itself unsound.
Nor is it clear why O'Brien should determine the outcome in
Martinez. The distinction between speech and nonspeech, al-
2 04 416 U.S. at 413-14. The O'Brien four-part test was strikingly similar:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important
or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.
391 U.S. at 377.
25 Shakur v. Malcolm, 525 F.2d 1144, 1148 n.3 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum); Battle v.
Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 425-26 (E.D. Okla. 1974).
206 United States v. Kahane, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); Teterud v. Gillman, 385
F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), aff'd sub nom. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.
1975).
202 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see note 204 supra & accompanying text.
20" For an explication of the test, see note 204 supra.
2019 See, e.g., Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning Case,
1968 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 14-27; Ely, supra note 184, at 1494-95; Henkin, The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 76-80 (1968).
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though it did not fit the facts of O'Brien, was an explicit premise
on which the O'Brien test rested.21a No such distinction can be
drawn in Martinez, in which the controversial regulations au-
thorized mail censorship, because there is simply no nonspeech
element in correspondence with prisoners. Justice Powell, writ-
ing for the Court in Martinez, acknowledged that O'Brien, for this
reason, was not "directly" controlling.21' O'Brien, however, may
have been completely irrelevant because the situation that trig-
gered the incidental restrictions test in O'Brien and other "sym-
bolic speech" cases 212 -the mixture of speech and nonspeech in
a course of conduct that the state seeks to restrict-was not pres-
ent in Martinez. Yet the Martinez test is virtually indistinguishable
from the O'Brien test,213 and the Martinez opinion neither cites
authority nor gives reasons for extending the incidental restric-
tions test beyond the "symbolic speech" cases.21 4
Assuming that the Martinez test is nevertheless sound in the
free speech context, several difficulties arise in transferring it to
the prison free exercise context. First, to the extent that O'Brien
is still controlling, there is a practical problem. It is frequently
impossible to resolve a restricted religious practice, such as
group worship, into a religious element and a nonreligious ele-
ment along the lines of the O'Brien distinction between speech
and nonspeech; if, despite Martinez, the incidental restrictions
test may be triggered only by a nonreligious element, the test
would be inapplicable in these cases. Second, the requirement
that the government interest be "substantial" appears to be
of little significance. In O'Brien, for example, the Court found
that a Selective Service Law amendment prohibiting registrants
from destroying their draft cards substantially increased the ef-
ficiency of the Selective Service System, which had previously
required only that registrants have the cards in their possession.
Because O'Brien is the leading case applying the substantial inter-
est requirement, and because nothing in the opinion "suggests
213 391 U.S. at 376.
211 416 U.S. at 411.
2 12 E.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
213 Compare text accompanying note 204 supra, with note 204 supra. The O'Brien test
is expressly limited to incidental restrictions, unlike the Martinez test, but the opinion in
Martinez makes it relatively clear that the test is to be similarly limited. See 416 U.S. at
409, 412-13.
214 It should be noticed that this doctrinal aberration cannot be explained by any
theory of the diminished constitutional rights retained by prisoners, for Martinez
expressly passed on the free speech rights of nonincarcerated citizens who correspond
with prisoners. 416 U.S. at 408-09.
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that the requirement will not always be satisfiable,' 215 the re-
quirement will offer little protection for free exercise rights.
216
Third, and more generally, the Martinez-O'Brien approach has
never been applied in the nonprison free exercise context. For
reasons that will be developed in part III-G, the same test should
apply to free exercise cases brought by prisoners and to those
brought by nonprisoners.
D. The Reasonableness Test
The standard most often applied in prison free exercise
cases is the reasonableness test:21 7 "[I]n order for a prisoner to
successfully challenge prison procedures on First Amendment
grounds, he has the burden of showing that the procedure or
practice in question is clearly unreasonable; and in this inquiry
the expert judgment of the prison officials is accorded substan-
tial deference. 218 In 1974, the Supreme Court apparently ap-
plied this standard in Pell v. Procunier,21 9 a prison free speech
case, and several lower courts have since relied on Pell as author-
ity for applying the reasonableness test in prison free exercise
cases. 2
20
Pell upheld the constitutionality of a California prison regu-
lation that banned "press and other media interviews with
specific individual inmates."'221 Prison officials contended that in
the past such interviews made "big wheels" of the inmate subjects
and that these individuals frequently became violent and dis-
rupted the institutional order. Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, was persuaded by this argument.
The opinion in Pell, unlike the opinion in Procunier v.
Martinez,222 focused on the first amendment rights of the prison-
ers themselves. "[A] prison inmate," wrote Justice Stewart, "re-
tains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with
his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objec-
2,5 Ely, supra note 184, at 1486 n.17.
216 But f. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974) (statement that the Court was
unable to find any "legitimate" state interest in Procunier v. Martinez).
21 E.g., Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Sharp v.
Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969) (Blackmun, J.); Hodges v. Klein, 421 F. Supp. 1224
(D.N.J. 1976) (semble); United States ex rel. Goings v. Aaron, 350 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn.
1972).
218 United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752, 762 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated for lack of
jurisdiction, 520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1975).
219 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
220E.g., United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752, 762 (S.D.N.Y.), vacated for lack of
jurisdiction, 520 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1975).
221 417 U.S. at 819.
222 416 U.S. 396 (1974); see notes 198-216 supra & accompanying text.
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tives of the corrections system. '223 Assessing the prisoners' chal-
lenge to the regulation in light of the legitimate objectives of
deterrence, rehabilitation, and security, the Court found dis-
positive the existence of what it viewed as equally effective al-
ternative modes of communication-unrestricted by prison
regulations-with persons outside the prison. 224 This analysis of
alternatives was held controlling despite the Court's acknow-
ledgment that it "would find the availability of such alternatives
unimpressive if they were submitted as justification for govern-
mental restriction of personal communication among members
of the general public. '225 Because the case involved the "inti-
mate" relationship 226 between the state and an inmate, however,
"the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials"
supported the use of an otherwise unacceptable standard. 7
This is a questionable justification for defining the scope of pris-
oners' free speech rights under an entirely different standard
than that applied in the nonprison free speech context.
228
Assuming that the Pell test is nevertheless sound in the area
of free speech, no comparable analysis of alternatives could be
undertaken in the area of free exercise. Religious practices are
rarely fungible in the way that Pell viewed modes of communica-
tion with nonincarcerated persons. For a court to consider
whether there is an effective alternative means of observing the
kosher dietary laws would be highly inappropriate. Nor is the
reasonableness standard that underlies Pell a sound test for the
prison free exercise cases. First, it has never been applied in a
major nonprison free exercise case,2 29 and no persuasive justifi-
cation has been articulated for applying a different test in the
prison context than that used in nonprison cases.2311 More fun-
223 417 U.S. at 822.
224 Id. at 823-25.
2 21Id. at 825. See also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
226 417 U.S. at 825 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973)).
221 Id. at 832.
228 See, e.g., Comment, First Amendment Rights of Prisoners to Have Access to the News
Media in Relation to Administrative Policy Bans upon Such Access, I PEPPERDINE L. REV. 382
(1974); Comment, Bans on Interviews of Prisoners: Prisoner and Press Rights After Pell and
Saxbe, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 718 (1975). See generally Plotkin, Recent Developments in the Law of
Prisoners' Rights, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 405, 414-16 (1975).
=9 But cf. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1097 (1973) (public school grooming regulation upheld under rational relationship
test); Cupit v. Baton Rouge Police Dep't, 277 So. 2d 454 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 281
So. 2d 745 (La. Sup. Ct. 1973) (police department grooming regulation upheld under
rational relationship test).
230 See text accompanying notes 251-71 infra.
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damentally, the resonableness test is unsuited to first amend-
ment analysis. In the area of economic legislation, in which it is
most often applied, the reasonableness test provides a deferen-
tial standard that respects the boundary between the legislative
and the judicial functions.231 This degree of deference is inap-
propriate in the area of individual rights.232 If the courts are to
carry out their duty "not to supervise prisons but to enforce the
constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including prisoners, 233 then
prisoners' rights should not be consigned to the personal discre-
tion of prison custodians.
E. The Ad Hoc Balancing Test
In several cases, the ad hoc balancing test has been applied
to prison free exercise claims.234 Under this approach, "when the
claim is that a prison regulation infringes upon a constitutional
right 'a court must balance the asserted need for the regulation
in furthering prison security or orderly administration against
the claimed constitutional right and the degree to which it has
been impaired.' "235
This approach presents several difficulties. First, results
reached under a balancing test are necessarily tied to the facts of
individual cases and are therefore of slight precedential value.
Second, in actual application, the weighing process in each case
is often pro forma to the extent that interests asserted by prison
authorities are viewed uncritically.2 36 The danger that unjus-
tified deference to prison officials will distort the balancing pro-
cess militates against using this test.
23 7
Third, and most fundamental, the balancing approach is
theoretically unsound. As one writer has recognized, specifically
in the free exercise context, "this approach ... tends to substi-
tute subjective judgment for objective standards. 2 38 Other
231 E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Mis-
souri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).
2 3 2 See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw
637-38 (9th ed. 1975).
233 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam).
234 E.g., Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc). Several courts
apparently have applied an ad hoc balancing approach while announcing that a differ-
ent standard was being applied. E.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969)
(announcing a "compelling interest" test but using an ad hoc balancing approach).
235 Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (quoting Smith v.
Robbins, 328 F. Supp. 162, 164 (D. Me. 1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 696 (1st Cir. 1972)).
236 See Comment, supra note 169, at 389-9 1.
237 See also Mims v. Shapp, 399 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
238 Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development (pt. 1), 80
HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1384 (1967).
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commentators have criticized ad hoc balancing because no aspect
of first amendment freedom is protected if a court finds that the
state's interest outweighs the infringed individual liberty.2 39 Mr.
Frantz is emphatic in this regard:
If the arguments employed to justify balancing are
carried to their logical conclusion, then the Constitu-
tion does not contain-and is not even capable of con-
taining-anything whatever which is unconditionally
obligatory. Defendants in criminal cases can be tried in
secret, or held incommunicado without trial, can be de-
nied knowledge of the accusation against them, and the
right to counsel, and the right to call witnesses in their
own defense, and the right to trial by jury.... Anything
which the Constitution says cannot be done can be done,
if Congress thinks and the Court agrees . . . that the
interests thereby served outweighed those which were
sacrificed. Thus the whole idea of a government of li-
mited powers, and of a written constitution as a device
for attaining that end, is at least potentially at stake.
2 41"
Although the Supreme Court has never completely shared this
view of the balancing test, Chief Justice WTarren, writing for the
majority, articulated similar concerns in a footnote in United
States v. Robel:
241
It has been suggested that this case should be decided
by "balancing" the governmental interest ... against the
First Amendment rights asserted by the appellee. This
we decline to do. We recognize that both interests are
substantial, but we deem it inappropriate for this Court
to label one as being more important or more substan-
tial than the other.
242
This inherent standardlessness is the most serious problem pre-
sented by the ad hoc balancing test.
A related difficulty with the ad hoc balancing test is peculiar
239 See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877 (1963); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968). These critics of
ad hoc balancing advocate a definitional balancing approach that this Comment en-
dorses. Text accompanying notes 293-330 infra.
240 Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1445 (1962) (em-
phasis in original).
241 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
242 Id. at 268 n.20.
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to the free exercise context. The use of this test in a religious
liberty case would entail an inquiry into the importance of a
particular religious practice to the individual and, perhaps, into
its centrality to the faith of which the individual is a member, for
these are the major "variables" on the individual's side of the
balance. These are delicate matters not readily susceptible to
evidentiary proof and judicial factfinding, 243 and a test that in
every case requires an assessment of both ought to be rejected
for this reason alone.
F. The Braunfeld v. Brown Test
In Braunfeld v. Brown,244 Chief Justice Warren articulated a
distinction between direct and indirect burdens on the free exer-
cise of religion. A direct burden is a prohibition of the religious
practice itself, such as a statute banning polygamy. An indirect
burden, by contrast, is any requirement or restriction that makes
it more difficult or more expensive for the practitioner to adhere
to his faith. The Court treated the Sunday closing law in
Braunfeld as an indirect burden because, although it effectively
prevented the petitioner, a Sabbatarian, from conducting busi-
ness six days a week as his competitors did, it did not require
him to violate his faith and remain open on Saturdays. Chief
Justice Warren intimated that the state's burden of justification
was lighter in regard to an indirect restriction such as this, and
upheld the law.245 Although the Braunfeld test has not been ap-
plied in the prison free exercise context, at least one commen-
tator has argued that the test is significant in that area. 46
The Braunfeld approach to free exercise cases presents sev-
eral difficulties. First, the labels "direct" and "indirect" do not
always forecast the result in a particular case. In Sherbert v.
Verner,247 the Court struck down an unemployment compensa-
tion law that imposed an indirect burden, while in Prince v.
242 See text accompanying notes 298-306 infra.
A critical distinction exists between an importance inquiry and a sincerity inquiry. The
former is rejected because it would tend to be awkward, difficult, and standardless; the
latter is approved. See note 306 infra.
244 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (plurality opinion). For a discussion of the case, see text
accompanying notes 145-56 supra.
145 366 U.S. at 605-07.
246 Note, A Braunfeld v. Brown Test for Indirect Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 48 MINN. L. REV. 1165 (1964). But cf. Comment, Religions Accommodation Under
Sherbert v. Verner: The Common Sense of the Matter, 10 VILL. L. REV. 337, 345 (1965)
(direct-indirect distinction termed unreal).
247 374 U.S. 398 (1963). For a discussion of the case, see text accompanying notes
157-61 supra.
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Massachusetts,248 the Court affirmed a conviction under the state's
child labor law even though it placed a direct burden on the
petitioner's religious liberty. Moreover, the Court has not
specified to what extent the state's burden of justification is less-
ened when an indirect burden is at issue; indeed, the Court has
not relied on the Braunfeld distinction since enunciating it in
1963.249 Nor is it clear that the distinction should have constitu-
tional significance: "[T]he rights of conscience are, in their na-
ture, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of
governmental hand ....
Finally, even if the distinction is sound for most purposes, it
provides little help in distinguishing among and deciding prison
free exercise cases. Virtually all such cases are brought because a
prison regulation effectively prohibits a given religious practice,
rather than making it more costly or inconvenient. When prison
officials grant the religious inmate an exemption from the regu-
lation, the prisoner has, in a sense, prevailed; although the fact
of incarceration may make observance of his faith more costly or
inconvenient than it would be outside of prison, this indirect
burden does not result from the regulation. When the prisoner
is not exempted from the regulation, on the other hand, it al-
most invariably amounts to a direct burden. The Braunfeld test,
centered around the direct-indirect distinction, thus does not
assist in analyzing the wide range of factual patterns that the
cases present.
G. The Compelling Interest Test
Of the various approaches to free exercise in prison dis-
cussed in this Comment, the compelling interest test provides the
greatest protection for inmates' rights. 251 This test is frequently
applied, 252 often in reliance on the Court's statement in Sherbert
v. Verner that the determinative issue in a free exercise case is
248 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
249 Cf., e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) ("the Wisconsin law af-
firmatively compels [petitioners], under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts un-
deniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs").
250 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 730 (J. Gales ed. 1789) (remarks of Rep. Daniel Carroll
of Maryland).
25-1 Cf., e.g., L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 36 (1975) ("[The
compelling interest test] appears to afford a degree of freedom for the exercise of
religion but little short of an impossible holding that the freedom is absolute and sub-
ject to no government regulation or restriction."). But see Linscott v. Millers Falls Co.,
440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971); CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Local 2548, United Textile Workers,
391 F. Supp. 287 (D.R.I. 1975).
252 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976); Neal v. Georgia,
469 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Jones v. Rundle, 453 F.2d 147 (3d
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whether some compelling state interest ... justifies the
substantial infringement of appellant's First Amend-
ment right. It is basic that no showing merely of a ra-
tional relationship to some colorable state interest would
suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area,
"[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount in-
terests, give occasion for permissible limitation," Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530.253
In addition, the compelling interest test for prison free exercise
cases has been advocated by the National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals254 and by other com-
mentators on the correctional system. 55
This Comment endorses the compelling interest approach
because it is the standard applied by the Supreme Court in non-
prison free exercise cases. As one lower court has stated, the
analytical tools needed to define the scope of religious liberty
do not change merely because the context of enforce-
ment is a prison. Upholding of a subjugation of pre-
ferred First Amendment rights by deferring to the dis-
cretion of the prison warden ... falls short of the duty
of a federal court. This does not mean that the circum-
stances peculiar to prison confinement are irrelevant
... . It does mean that the strict tests should not be
abandoned .... 56
This argument for an identity of approach is persuasive
because the values protected by the free exercise clause exist in
the prison community to the same extent that they exist in the
society outside of prison. Constitutional standards are fashioned
Cir. 1971); Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971); Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F.
Supp. 1126 (S.D. Il1. 1976); United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd
sub nom. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); cf. Bethea v. Daggett, 329 F.
Supp. 796, 797 (N.D. Ga. 1970) ("substantial and controlling interest") (dictum), aff'd
per curiam, 444 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1971).
253 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION
35 (1975) ("It is the compelling-interest rule to which the present Court appears com-
mitted."). See also CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Local 2548, United Textile Workers, 391 F.
Supp. 287 (D.R.I. 1975).
54 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS:
CORRECTIONS, standards 2:15, 2:16 (1973).
255 S. KRANTZ, R. BELL, J. BRANT & M. MAGRUDER, MODEL RULES AND REGULATIONS
ON PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, rules IB-3 to IB-12 (1973). See also Fox,
supra note 186, at 166.
256 Rowland v. Sigler, 327 F. Supp. 821, 827 (D. Neb.), aff'd sub nom. Rowland v.
Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971); accord, Note, The Prisoner and the First Amendment:
Freedom Behind Bars?, 4 Loy. CHI. L.J. 109, 135-36 (1973).
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essentially to protect particular values. In a range of factual set-
tings, the state's interest in overriding those values will some-
times be great and sometimes be small; these variations are taken
into account in the application of the test, rather than through
the creation of a new test for each fact pattern that emerges.
This point is illustrated by the consistent application of the clear
and present danger standard to content-based suppression of
speech, regardless of the nature or degree of the state interest
asserted as justification for the suppression.2 57 If the state in-
terests are the major determinants of the applicable constitu-
tional standard, the very different interests in regulating speech
that have surfaced in the cases would have generated different
tests, each to be triggered by the assertion of a particular state
interest. This has not, however, been the history of content-
based suppression of speech. Given, then, that the constitutional
values underlying a particular guarantee of individual rights are
the primary determinants of the standard by which infringe-
ments must be measured, free exercise cases should be ap-
proached identically when core free exercise values are present.
This is not to say that similar religious claims of prisoners and
nonincarcerated citizens will necessarily be finally resolved in the
same way. An unconfined Muslim may travel to Chicago to visit
Elijah Muhammad, whereas an imprisoned Muslim may not.
258
The standard, however, should be the same in both cases, if the
core free exercise values are the same.
259
That the free exercise values identifiable outside of prison
exist with equal intensity in prison can be demonstrated. First,
some of the values inherent in the religious liberty guarantee
resemble those underlying the free speech guarantee. Among
these shared values may be found what Professor Emerson de-
scribed as the individual's "power to realize his potentiality as a
257 Compare Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (state interest in citing
newspaper for contempt asserted to be protection of its courts from intimidation and
coercion; clear and present danger test applied), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951) (plurality opinion) (state interest in suppressing advocacy of communist
revolution asserted to be self-preservation; clear and present danger test applied).
2"58 The test proposed in part IV of this Comment proceeds on the assumption that
until a prisoner has completed his sentence, the state may, without violating the free
exercise clause, deny him the right to leave prison in order to practice his religion. See
text accompanying notes 279-92 infra.
259 The present Supreme Court does not accept this approach, as is clear from the
free speech cases discussed in parts III-C and III-D. See text accompanying notes
198-233 supra. Prisoners have instead been accorded diminished first amendment rights
on what may be termed a theory of stratified citizenship. See also DORSEN, BENDER &
NEUBORNE, supra note 142, at 1320-1433.
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human being. '26" This self-fulfillment value is not only present
but is augmented in the prison environment, which offers di-
minished outlets for expression and generally lacks identity-
promotive opportunities. Another value common to free exer-
cise and free speech is their contribution to the advancement of
knowledge and understanding. The free and vigorous exchange
of ideas and opinions allows an individual to weigh alternatives
before deciding how to guide his behavior. This need for infor-
mation exists in prison, notwithstanding the regimentation of
institutional life. If prisoners' decisions about their immediate
and future conduct are to be well considered, the exposure to
religious beliefs that unimpeded free exercise yields is impor-
tant.
The religious liberty guarantee secures other values un-
shielded by the free speech guarantee. 26' The free exercise
clause embodies an acceptance of the Apostle Peter's injunction:
"We ought to obey God rather than men. 262 This acceptance
came about through the convergence in revolutionary America
of two distinct lines of church-state theory. From the Protestant
dissenters came the principle of uncoerced religious faith, and
from the secular humanists came the axiom of uncoerced reli-
gious dissent.2 63 These two principles fused into the funda-
mental free exercise value, which Professor Giannella identified
as "respect for the inviolability of conscience. '264 The violation
of a man's conscience often works an exceptional harm that,
unless compellingly justified, amounts to "a moral wrong in and
of itself. '2 65 "Personal alienation from one's Maker, frustration
of one's ultimate mission in life, and violation of the religious
person's integrity are all at stake when the right to worship is
threatened.2 66 These considerations also reveal a primary con-
cern for the individual conscience rather than for the group of
religious believers.267
All this suggests that the essential free exercise values may
be found in the prison community. An inmate's conscience is no
260 Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879
(1963).
261 See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAv
1505-09 (9th ed. 1975).262 Acts 5:29.
263 See generally P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 22-29 (1964).
264 Giannella, supra note 238, at 1386.
265 Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REV. 327, 337 (1969).
266 Giannella, supra note 238, at 1427.
267 Pfeffer, The Right to Religious Liberty, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS 328 (N. Dor-
sen ed. 1972).
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less inviolable than that of an unconfined citizen, and a violation
could well work an even greater harm upon the inmate, whose
means of spiritual recovery are limited by the prison environ-
ment. Finally, although an inmate's spiritual deprivation may not
threaten the religious liberty of unconfined members of his
faith, the individualistic focus of the free exercise guarantee op-
poses justifying the single deprivation on this basis.
An additional free exercise value, rehabilitation, is peculiar
to the prison context. Religious expression can significantly aid a
prisoner in reevaluating himself and preparing for a return to
society. 268 In the lonely, stifling prison environment, an inmate
can sometimes find great strength and self-respect in religious
practice. 269 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit echoed this sentiment in an opinion requiring prison
officials to offer compelling reasons for denying pork-free diets
to Muslims:
Treatment that degrades the inmate, invades his pri-
vacy, and frustrates the ability to choose pursuits
through which he can manifest himself and gain self-
respect erodes the very foundations upon which he can
prepare for a socially useful life. Religion in prison sub-
serves the rehabilitative function by providing an area
within which the inmate may reclaim his dignity and
reassert his individuality.
270
Although some commentators have expressed skepticism
about the rehabilitative function of religion,2 7' the possibility of
such an effect makes rehabilitation at least a potential value of
free exercise in prison. The values of self-fulfillment, the ad-
vancement of knowledge, and the inviolability of conscience are
equally present inside and outside prison. For this reason, the
test by which infringements on free exercise are measured
should also be the same.
At the heart of the compelling interest test is the require-
268 H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 492-95 (3d ed.
1959).
269 See, e.g., THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X, 152-291 (A. Haley ed. 1965).
270 Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnotes omitted).
271 See, e.g., R. NEESE, PRISON EXPOSURES (1959):
Contrary to popular belief-or perhaps wishful thinking-religion plays a very
small part in a prison's rehabilitation program. Going to church does not
change men from criminals to noncriminals . . . . The automotive mechanic
training school is 23 times as successful in keeping men out as both chapels
together, and a radio repair school is more than 40 times as successful.
Id. 69.
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ment that the state's interest in abridging free exercise be com-
pelling. One commentator has written that this high standard
"appears to afford a degree of freedom for the exercise of reli-
gion but little short of an impossible holding that the freedom
is absolute and subject to no government regulation or restric-
tion. '272 Although religious freedom in prison will be signifi-
candy limited even under the compelling interest approach,273
this standard is nevertheless preferable in order to assure the
greatest possible vindication of free exercise rights. The conse-
quences of relaxing the "compelling" standard are illustrated by
a reexamination of the Procunier v. Martinez test.2 74 Like the
compelling interest test, the Martinez test contains two elements:
a requirement that the state interest be of a certain weight, and a
requirement that the means used to further this interest be the
least drastic means possible. A significant distinction exists, how-
ever, in the degree of importance required of the state
interest.275 In contrast to the "compelling" requirement, the
"substantial or important interest" requirement of Martinez is
satisfied by a considerably lesser showing. The leading case find-
ing a "substantial" state interest is United States v. O'Brien,276 the
272 L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAESAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 36 (1975). But see Linscott v.
Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1971) (federal labor policy viewed as compelling
interest justifying infringement on free exercise); CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Local 2548,
United Textile Workers, 391 F. Supp. 287 (D.R.I. 1975) (state labor policy viewed as
compelling interest justifying infringement on free exercise).
273 See text accompanying notes 343-57 infra.
274 See text accompanying notes 198-216 supra.
275 The least drastic means elements of the tests are, however, virtually identical.
See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 407 (1963). Thus, both tests contain the latent ambiguity discussed at notes 331-42
infra & accompanying text.
276 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See text accompanying notes 203-16 supra. Martinez appears
at first glance to settle for prison cases the question of the substantiality of asserted state
interests: "[Prison officials] must show that a regulation ... furthers one or more of the
substantial governmental interests of security, order, and rehabilitation." 416 U.S. 396, 413
(1974) (emphasis supplied). Yet this listing of substantial state interests, unaccompanied
by any discussion, cannot be taken as the Court's considered and exhaustive cataloguing
of interests important enough to justify an infringement on first amendment freedoms.
See text accompanying notes 326-30 infra. The Martinez list amounts to little more than
a statement that any good faith restriction on first amendment rights will satisfy the
substantial interest element of the test. This is so because, in a very broad sense, all the
abridgments of free exercise discussed in part I-B, text accompanying notes 64-167
supra, further the "substantial governmental interest of. . .order. ... Without con-
siderable elaboration upon the "order" interest, something the Court fails to provide,
no distinction is possible between those characteristics of prison order that are substan-
tial, such as safety, and those that are trivial, such as convenience. Thus, the order
interest as presently stated is uninstructive as a guide to substantiality, and the lower
courts will have to evaluate asserted governmental interests on a case-by-case basis
-unless the Martinez Court intended that all invocations of the order interest be held
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very case that announced the standard. The Court there found a
sufficient state interest in the incremental efficiency gained by
imposing on draft-eligible males the requirement that they not
mutilate or destroy their draft cards, in addition to the existing
requirement that they always possess their cards. This interest,
held to be "substantial," is not of a "compelling" magnitude. The
difference between the two tests was explicitly noted by the Sec-
ond Circuit in Kahane v. Carlson,2 77 in which the court queried
whether "restrictions on prisoners' First Amendment rights need
be justified by an 'important or substantial government interest'
or by the more stringent demands of a 'compelling government
interest.' ,278 Because the compelling interest test is used in non-
prison free exercise cases, that approach should also be applied
to inmate religious liberty claims.
IV. THE COMPELLING INTEREST TEST: A PROPOSAL
A. The Scope of the Test
The compelling interest test developed in the remaining sec-
tions of this Comment is intended to govern all prison free exer-
cise cases except those in which a prisoner seeks to be released
from prison, even for a brief period of time. When an asserted
free exercise claim requires that the prisoner be released,
whether to worship at a particular church or religious meeting-
place, to proselytize in the community, 279 or to embark on a
substantial, in which case the test is unacceptable because it fails to exclude from "sub-
stantial" status such interests as cost and convenience. See text accompanying notes
324-25 infra.
277 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
278 Id. at 495 n.6 (emphasis supplied).
279 State v. Richardson, 130 N.J. Super. 63, 324 A.2d 914 (1974), is apparently the
only reported case in which such a claim was asserted. Richardson converted to the
Jehovah's Witnesses sect shortly after he was imprisoned, and subsequently filed a mo-
tion for reconsideration of his sentence. The court described this motion as follows:
Instead of a reduction of sentence defendant requests that this court grant
him a release from the State Prison one weekend a month "to participate most
actively with the rest of the Jehovah's Witnesses out there." His activities in the
community would include attendance at religious services at the Kingdom Hall,
going from door to door, bringing the good news and "(e)verything the Wit-
nesses do in the field." Most important to defendant is that he be given the
opportunity to attend ministry schools and services in the community so that
he "could become more enlightened" and "could enlighten the brothers that
have been converted here in the prison as to the organization out there." De-
fendant testified he would restrict his activities to the Trenton, Hopewell or
Princeton communities and abide by any restrictions which the court seeks to
place on his mobility. He would plan to live with his parents during the
weekend releases.
Id. at 66-67, 324 A.2d at 916.
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religious pilgrimage, the claim should be regarded as a challenge
to the state's right to incarcerate the individual and, for several
reasons, should be rejected. Although prison officials may, in
their discretion, grant an abbreviated release on religious
grounds, this Comment argues that they are not required to do
SO.28
0
Sharp disagreement exists over how to define the scope of
prisoners' constitutional rights. One approach treats prisoners as
a group whose rights are effectively forfeited whenever they
conflict with the prison regimen. Following that approach, the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated in a 1964 opinion
that "[a] prisoner has only such rights as can be exercised with-
out impairing the requirements of prison discipline. '281 The
other approach asserts that prisoners retain their constitutional
rights, but that those rights must be modified somewhat because
of incarceration. This dispute is important and far-reaching;
282
but even the broadest statement of the rights retained by prison-
ers implicitly excludes the asserted free exercise right to be re-
leased for a brief period. In a 1944 opinion, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit stated: "A prisoner retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by neces-
sary implication, taken from him by law. ' 283 In a case in which
release is sought, the asserted free exercise right includes the
right-for brief periods-not to be incarcerated, in order that
the prisoner may pursue his religion. This subsidiary right, how-
ever, is expressly taken from each prisoner by law when he is
sentenced to a particular institution for a stated period of time.
The sentence need not enumerate the activities that the prisoner
will be unable to pursue outside the prison during his confine-
ment; it nevertheless expressly negates any right to leave prison
28 If prison officials elect to grant a release to one inmate, however, all other in-
mates must be considered on a nondiscriminatory basis for similar privileges. See also
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam). In State v. Richardson, 130 N.J. Super.
63, 324 A.2d 914 (1974), a prisoner alleged that other inmates were frequently released
for periods of several hours in order to attend religious services outside the institution,
and that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment required that he be
released for one weekend each month. The court, finding that releases were available
only on an occasional basis, and only to those who, unlike Richardson, were classified as
"minimum security" prisoners, rejected the equal protection argument. Richardson's
challenge to his own classification as a "maximum security" prisoner was dismissed for
failure to raise the claim in the proper forum.
281 Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906, 908 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892
(1964); accord, Mims v. Shapp, 399 F. Supp. 818, 822 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
282 See generally Hollen, supra note 34.
283 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (per curiam), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 887 (1945).
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in order to pursue any such activity. Nor can any distinctions be
drawn based on the duration of the requested release. The crim-
inal sentence denies the right to spend Easter Sunday in
church 284 as well as the right to make an extended pilgrimage to
Mecca. In short, the denial of an asserted free exercise right to
be released is entirely consistent with even the broadest reading
of prisoners' free exercise rights and of prisoners' retained rights
generally.
Expanding the idea that the right to a brief release is analyt-
ically indistinguishable from the right not to be incarcerated at
all, one could view an asserted right to be released as a demand
for exemption from the operation of the particular criminal law
violated by the prisoner. The courts have at times passed on such
demands in cases in which a defendant asserted religiously moti-
vated objections to the substantive content of a particular law. In
nearly every case, the free exercise defense has been rejected.
285
Thus, religious beliefs have not relieved citizens of the obligation
to pay federal income taxes, 286 nor exempted them from pro-
hibitions on polygamy,2 87 nonregistration with the Selective
Service System,288 counseling draft evasion, 28 9 manufacturing
marijuana,2911 or handling poisonous snakes.29' It would seem
wholly inconsistent with this rejection of religious opposition to
the content of particular laws for the courts to recognize and
284 See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 324 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
285 See, e.g., Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937, 938 (4th Cir. 1943), quoted with
approval in Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 311 (8th Cir. 1960). But see People
v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (reversing convictions
of Navajo Indians who used peyote as part of a religious ceremony), noted in 17 STAN.
L. REV. 494 (1965).
286E.g., Autenrieth v. Cullen, 418 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1036 (1970); United States v. Haworth, 386 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes
."); id. amend. XVI.
287 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890) (upholding requirement that voters take an oath disavowing membership in any
group that practices bigamy).
288 E.g., United States v. Bertram, 477 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Craft, 423 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1970) (collecting cases). See also United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623-24 (1931); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366
(1918).
289 Baxley v. United States, 134 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1943), quoted with approval in
Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 311 (8th Cir. 1960).
29 Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 886 (1973).
But cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (en
banc) (reversing convictions of Navajo Indians who used peyote in religious rituals).
291 Harden v. State, 188 Tenn. 17, 216 S.W.2d 708 (1948); cf. State ex rel. Swann v.
Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99 (Tenn. 1975) (handling of poisonous snakes is subject to abate-
ment as a common law nuisance), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 (1976).
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uphold religious opposition to incarceration, the consequence of
violating a criminal law. Unless a free exercise defense to specific
substantive offenses is recognized, no prisoner should prevail on
the claim that his confinement per se impermissibly infringes his
right to the free exercise of his religion.
292
B. The Test Defined
Although the compelling interest test has been endorsed as
the preferred standard for prison free exercise claims, this test
as typically applied is not without problems in either the prison
or the nonprison context. This Comment proposes a refinement
that will resolve much of the ambiguity and will make the com-
pelling interest test a more cogent approach to constitutional
evaluation.
1. The Compelling Interest Requirement
A subtle ambiguity lies beneath the use that has been made
of the compelling interest test in free exercise cases. Relying on
Sherbert and Yoder 293 for guidance, some courts have applied
the compelling interest test in such a way as to make the evalua-
tion little more than an ad hoc balancing of the competing in-
terests. 294 This formulation, which usually identifies as relevant
considerations the importance of the religious practice to the in-
dividual and the impact of that practice on society, requires that
the state interest be compelling relative to that of the practitioner.
This "relatively" compelling approach is not fundamentally dis-
tinguishable from an ad hoc weighing of interests, and therefore.
is subject to the same criticisms directed at the simple balancing
test. As discussed earlier, 295 ad hoc balancing is essentially form-
less: "[B]y hypothesis [it] means that there is no rule to be ap-
plied, but only interests to be weighed. 296 Moreover, such an
approach is especially inappropriate in prisoners' rights cases, in
which the courts tend to be overly deferential to administrative
decisions; "it is more than mere coincidence," Professor Nimmer
292 This result was reached in what is apparently the only reported case raising the
issue. See State v. Richardson, 130 N.J. Super. 63, 68, 324 A.2d 914, 916-17 (1974);
note 279 supra.
293 See text accompanying notes 157-67 supra.
2'1 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969); Marshall v. District of
Columbia, 392 F. Supp. 1012, 1013-14 (D.D.C. 1975); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395,
399 (D.N.H. 1974).
295 See text accompanying notes 234-43 supra.
296 Nimmer, supra note 239, at 939.
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has noted, that the state usually prevails when a balancing test is
applied.
297
Another benefit resulting from a rejection of the "relatively"
compelling approach is the elimination of the need for inquiry
into the religious importance of a particular practice. Even
though the courts have traditionally engaged in such an inquiry
in free exercise cases, often with great sensitivity, 298 this evalua-
tion should be left to theologians. The constitutional necessity of
such an inquiry is doubtful. "The protection the Constitution
extends to the exercise of religion does not turn on the theologi-
cal importance of the disputed activity. Rather constitutional
protection is triggered by the fact that it is religious. 299 In addi-
tion, the evaluation is of dubious constitutional validity, for any
inquiry into the importance of a religious practice necessarily
involves the assessment of imponderables, an enterprise falling
outside the scope of judicial competence .3 " 11 Religious practices,
"like some tones and colors, have existence for one, but none at
all for another. They cannot be verified to the minds of those
whose field of consciousness does not include religious
insight.' '31 1 For a court to enter this area and pronounce certain
activities more significant than others is to create an enormous
potential for intolerable results. An importance inquiry could
lead a court examining Orthodox Judaism to decide in the face
of a Talmudic declaration that the laws of God are not
hierarchical,3 2 that keeping kosher is not as important as light-
ing the sabbath candles, and that therefore prison officials may
restrict the former, but not the latter; or that keeping kosher is
297 Id. 939-40.
29" See, e.g., United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd sub
nom. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (kosher dietary laws centrally
important to Orthodox Judaism); People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (use of peyote centrally important to members of Native American
Church); State ex rel. Swann v. Pack, 527 S.W.2d 99, 105-06 (Tenn. 1975); Davis, Plural
Marriage and Religious Freedom: The Impact of Reynolds v. United States, 15 ARz. L. REV.
287 (1973); 17 STAN. L. REv. 494 (1965) (approval of importance inquiry in People v.
Woody).
299 Unitarian Church W. v. McConnell, 337 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 416 U.S. 932 (1974).
3" Cf. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 96 S. Ct. 2372 (1976) (state
court ruling setting aside as arbitrary the defrocking of bishop because violative of
Church Penal Code constitutes improper judicial interference in religious controversy);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969) (reversing settlement of church property dispute in which jury was
asked to determine if church had deviated from its original tenets).
3"' United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
32 See Brief for Appellee at 50 app., Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
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not as important to Orthodox Jews as wearing beards is to Mus-
lims, and that therefore prison officials may restrict the practice
of the Orthodox Jews, but not that of the Muslims.
Such results are not inconceivable. In Walker v. Blackwell,3
the Fifth Circuit rejected Muslim requests for special meals dur-
ing the Fast of Ramadan, terming the denials "minor restrictions
on the practice of the faith of Islam." No expert testimony was
taken on the importance of this practice to the Muslim
religion.3114 Although the court attempted to render a reasoned
decision, its conclusion that the special meals were of minor im-
portance illustrates the possibility for harm resulting from an
importance evaluation. Judicial assessment of religious practices
contravenes Mr. Justice Jackson's eloquent statement in the sec-
ond flag-salute case: "[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox in ... religion .... -305 To avoid
the importance inquiry, and the general lack of standards re-
ferred to earlier, the "relatively" compelling interest test should
be rejected.
3 11 6
3.3 411 F.2d 23, 26 (5th Cir. 1969).
314 See id. at 25.
305 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
3o6 This rejection of an importance inquiry does not entail the rejection of an in-
quiry into the sincerity of a professed religious belief. Because protection of individual
conscience lies at the core of the free exercise guarantee, that clause is not violated
when a practice interfered with by the state is an insincere one, the deprivation of
which cannot work serious injury to the conscience. See Giannella, supra note 238, at
1417.
The Supreme Court considered this issue in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944), a criminal prosecution for fraud in which defendants allegedly used the mails to
solicit funds, representing themselves as divine messengers with supernatural powers.
The Court held that to evaluate the truth or falsity of these representations would
violate the first amendment. Chief Justice Stone, dissenting, saw no constitutional obsta-
cle to examining the defendants' state of mind, "a fact as capable of fraudulent misrep-
resentation as is one's physical condition or the state of his bodily health." Id. at 90
(Stone, C.J., dissenting). Although a sincerity inquiry is not free from difficulty, as Jus-
tice Jackson detailed in his dissent, id. at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting), such an ap-
proach is tenable and has been approved. See, e.g.,- United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 185 (1965); Maguire v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp. 637, 640 (D. Conn. 1975); Marcus,
supra note 141, at 1243-44. But see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (dic-
tum); Sheldon v. Fannin, 221 F. Supp. 766, 775 (D. Ariz. 1963).
A sincerity inquiry is especially important in prison free exercise cases because the
bleakness of institutional life may create an incentive falsely to allege religious motiva-
tion for acts, such as growing a beard, that will be tolerated only if done in pursuit of a
religious belief held in good faith. This hypothetically greater incentive to fabricate
religious beliefs supports a more exacting scrutiny of prisoner sincerity than that ap-
plied in a nonprison case, in which less incentive to be insincere may exist. The scrutiny
to which a prisoner's sincerity is exposed, however, must not be so extreme as to re-
quire an impossible showing. Because no precise limitation can be placed on the degree
of severity permissible in scrutinizing a claim, a procedural device is perhaps appro-
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The alternative to the "relative" standard is an "absolutely"
compelling interest test fashioned according to the "definitional
balancing" approach to the first amendment. 3 07 Professor DuVal
has distinguished the definitional balancing approach from the
ad hoc balancing approach:
[D]efinitional balancing seeks to formulate rules for
differentiating between protected and unprotected
[religious practices]. In formulating this distinction, the
interests in freedom of [religious practices] must be
weighed against competing governmental interests in
much the same manner as under the ad hoc balancing
test. The outcome of the process, however, is a rule
which governs not only the case before the court, but
future cases as well .... Moreover, the adoption of a
rule will make it easier for the courts to resist popular
pressures for suppression in particular cases. 308
priate. A comparison of two cases in which the sincerity of American Indian inmates
claiming a religious right to wear long hair was tested suggests that placing the burden
of proof on the prison officials is a desirable prophylactic. In United States ex rel. Go-
ings v. Aaron, 350 F. Supp. 1 (D. Minn. 1972), the district court, apparently placing the
burden of proof on the plaintiff inmate, held that his free exercise claim was not sin-
cere despite his choice, only 55 days before his release, to undergo punitive isolation
rather than cut his hair. Citing evidence introduced by prison officials, such as the fact
that "[n]o other Indians at the Institution are motivated by religious customs the way he
[plaintiff] claims to be," the judge doubted that, in the eight months since plaintiff
made a vow at his father's grave to pursue the Indian faith, "the petitioner has become
so devoutly religious . . . that he cannot forego growing his hair to the desired length
for another brief period." Id. at 4-5. This unfortunate conclusion, attributable to the
court's undisguised suspicion of the plaintiff's motives, would have been more easily
reversible as "clearly erroneous" had the burden of proof been on the prison officials,
who evidently submitted no substantial evidence of insincerity. In Teterud v. Gillman,
385 F. Supp. 153 (S.D. Iowa 1974), aff'd sub nom. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th
Cir. 1975), however, after considering extensive evidence concerning plaintiff's past re-
ligious activities (raised in a Catholic orphanage) and present spiritual practices (fol-
lower of Native American Church), Chief Judge Hanson concluded that "[a]t best, the
evidence on the issue of plaintiff's sincerity is somewhat contradictory. . . . The Court
can never know with assurance whether Teterud is sincere or insincere. The defen-
dants, however, have not presented sufficient evidence to show that Teterud's beliefs
are not made in good faith." Id. at 157. Placing the burden of proof on the prison
officials, the court thus found plaintiff's free exercise claim to be sincere. Because no
Supreme Court authority exists on the allocation of the burden of proof in a sincerity
hearing-the Court did not address this issue in Ballard-the question is unresolved,
and this Comment endorses the Teterud approach.
"" The definitional balancing-versus-ad hoc balancing controversy, has been dis-
cussed too fully elsewhere to warrant extended treatment here. See, e.g., T. EMERSON,
TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966); Ely, supra note 184;
Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Nimmer, supra
note 239.
308 DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for Truth: Toward a Teleological
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Proponents of definitional balancing cite the Supreme Court's
decisions in New York Times v. Sullivan3 9 and Brandenburg v.
Ohio,31" as models of this approach.3 1 1 In those cases the Court
defined two categories of expression-in New York Times, speech
that is knowingly or recklessly false and defamatory, and in Bran-
denburg, speech that is "directed to" imminent lawlessness-and
held those categories to be unprotected by the first amendment.
The most prominent advantage of this approach is a reduction
of the need to balance on a case-by-case basis. The necessity of
evaluating each case on its facts is not obviated: the determination
whether a given instance of expression is within the protected
category is, and should be, guided by the particular circum-
stances of the case. Additionally, the definition of the categories
in the first instance involves a general balancing of interests.31 2
This approach is nevertheless superior to the ad hoc approach.
In the free exercise area, the Supreme Court has apparently
combined the two approaches. The test emerging from Sherbert
and Yoder 313 has been stated as follows:
[I]f the individual demonstrates that his actions are sin-
cerely religious and have been interfered with as a re-
sult of a state regulation, the state must demonstrate
that it has a compelling interest in the regulation, an
interest which could not be promoted by any less re-
strictive means. If the state makes that demonstration, it
prevails in the case; if not, it loses.
3 1 4
This test has an ad hoc balancing dimension in that the court
must determine in each case whether a given state interest is
compelling. The Court has not, however, rested on an entirely
situational determination, because it has defined certain state
interests-such as administrative convenience and the detection
of fraudulent claims-as not compelling in any case. 31 5 This
Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 179 (1972) (foot-
notes omitted).
309 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31- 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
3" See, e.g., Ely, supra note 184; Nimmer, supra note 239.
312 See DuVal, supra note 308, at 179.
313 See text accompanying notes 157-67 supra.
314 Marcus, supra note 141, at 1242.
315 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see cases cited note 324 infra. In the
religion cases, unlike the expression cases, the Court has classified the state's interest,
rather than the individual's activity. This shift in focus is inconsequential in terms of
first amendment definitional balancing, for its purposes are equally furthered by either
emphasis.
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Comment proposes that this classification process be completed
and particularized in the prison context in order to formulate a
definitional balancing test in which certain state interests gener-
ally are compelling, and others generally are notA16 Such a clas-
sification system is more protective of first amendment interests
than the previously suggested alternatives.
3A17
The proposed categorization of state interests should be
guided by the principle that a prisoner retains all rights except
those that are "expressly, or by necessary implication, taken...
by law."'318 Criminal laws expressly provide only for confine-
ment. Keeping the inmate confined, then, is the fundamental
state interest that must be classified as compelling3 19 because of
its centrality to the social purposes attributed to incarceration.
Other prison interests can be similarly classified. State interests
commonly advanced to justify restrictions on religious practice
can be placed in one of two categories: 1) those interests flowing
from the purposes of incarceration itself; and 2) those interests
flowing from the need to administer the prison in an orderly
manner.3
2 0
The first category of interests is comprised of restraint, de-
terrence, and rehabilitation-generally considered to be the con-
temporary purposes of the American penal system.3 2' Restraint
316 Even if a restriction on inmate free exercise is justified by a compelling state
interest, the restriction must be the least drastic means possible to satisfy the state's
interest. See text accompanying notes 331-42 infra.
317 One commentator has suggested a definitional balancing approach to free exer-
cise adjudication that resurrects the belief-action categories of Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Note, The Amish Exception: A Constitutionally Compelled
Exemption?, 34 U. PITT. L. REv. 274 (1972). This distinction, which would categorize
belief as absolutely protected and practice as reasonably regulable, is both gratuitous-
-because belief is of necessity unregulable-and weak-because reasonableness is too
ambiguous a standard of review. See text accompanying notes 217-33 supra.
318 Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887
(1945).
"' State v. Cubbage, 210 A.2d 555, 565 (Del. Super. Ct. 1965):
The question is-what rights should be restricted or even taken away entirely?
Our statutes restrict those rights demanding of their very nature free move-
ment of the body. Thus it would seem that the primary punishment of a
prison is movement. A natural consequence would seem to be that the prisoner
is entitled to those same rights as any other citizen which are not in conflict
with the order of the court restricting the free movement of the body.
32" For an analogous breakdown of prison justifications for restricting first amend-
ment freedoms, see Note, The Right of Expression in Prison, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 407,
410-11 (1967).
321 See E. SUTHERLAND & D. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 496-521 (9th ed. 1974). For a
survey of the development of modern penal theory, see H. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW
HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 285-601 (3d ed. 1959). See also S. RuBIN, THE LAW OF
CRIMINAL CORRECTION 735-64 (2d ed. 1973). This Comment accepts prevention as the
animating principle of American penology. See generally Dershowitz, The Origins of Pre-
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
is the isolation of the inmate from society for its protection; the
state interest in prison security adequate to prevent escapes is
correlative to the restraint interest. A necessary corrollary to the
restraint interest is the concern for safety. Protecting institu-
tional personnel and inmates from violent prisoners constitutes
an interest of the same magnitude as restraint. Deterrence is the
discouragement of criminal activity through exposure to the un-
desirable life of the confined. Rehabilitation is ideally a resociali-
zation of the inmate. Given the existence of a prison system, all
three are compelling state interests. Each is a central purpose of
incarceration, and each arises by necessary implication from the
criminal law's sentence of confinement.
When a prison contains detainees awaiting trial as well as
convicted offenders, the state's interests in regard to each group
must be determined independently. Rehabilitation and deter-
rence are not legitimate interests if a prisoner has not been
convicted.3 2 It has been held that "[t]he First Amendment rights
of a detainee may be limited only to the extent necessary to
ensure his appearance at trial and to assure the security of the
institution. '323 Thus, although the proposed test is fully appli-
cable to free exercise claims raised by pretrial detainees, a con-
siderably narrower range of asserted state interests will justify
restrictions on detainees' free exercise rights than will justify
identical restrictions on the rights of convicted offenders.
The second category of state interests centers upon the ad-
ministrative needs of the prison community. These interests re-
late less directly to the sentence of confinement than do the
interests of restraint, deterrence, and rehabilitation. Far from
being central to the purpose of incarceration, the administrative
interests-considerations such as economy and convenience-
arise incidentally and are largely indifferent to the purposes of
the prison system. They exist whenever a substantial group of
people are collected in one place, and not because the collection
ventive Confinement in Anglo-American Law (pts. 1-2), 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 781 (1974).
Retribution is not considered here as a modern purpose of incarceration. But see Gregg
v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2930 (1976); H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY
230-37 (1968); I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101, 131-33 (J. Ladd
trans. 1965).
3 22 E.g., Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232, 1237 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (collecting
cases).
323 Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); accord, Jones
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99-100 (N.D. Ohio), after hearing on the issue of relief, 330
F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir.
1972); see Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 336 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 389 F. Supp.
964 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975).
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has been undertaken for certain social purposes. Economy and
convenience have generally been denied compelling status by the
Supreme Court in nonprison cases, 32 4 and therefore they should
not be classified as compelling in prisoner free exercise cases.
325
To summarize, if a state interest assertedly justifying a restriction
on religious practices relates directly to one of the central pur-
poses of incarceration, that interest is compelling; if, on the
other hand, the interest is merely administrative, it is not com-
pelling.
The refined compelling interest prong differs not only from
the "relative" compelling interest test-in that the refined model
rejects ad hoc balancing in favor of a definitional balancing
approach-but also from the substantial interest element of the
Martinez test, which at first glance also appears to adopt a defini-
tional balancing approach in the statement that "[p]rison officials
... must show that a regulation. .. furthers one or more of the
substantial governmental interests of security, order, and
rehabilitation. '326 Despite this list of substantial interests, the
suspicion persists that the Martinez Court was not experimenting
with definitional balancing theory. To the extent that the desig-
nation of security, order, and rehabilitation as "substantial" in-
terests means that they are substantial relative to the first
amendment claim to uncensored prisoner correspondence at
issue in Martinez, a reading suggested by the Court's treatment of
Martinez in Pell v. Procunier,327 the opinion is not meaningful
definitional balancing and is at least in part vulnerable to the
numerous criticisms of an ad hoc approach.
Furthermore, even if the Martinez Court was engaging in
definitional balancing, the refined compelling interest element
differs from the Martinez test in regard to which state interests it
identifies as constitutionally sufficient. The proposed test clas-
sifies as compelling three primary interests: restraint, and its
324 See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969). But cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (saving money a legitimate
and rational state interest in the context of a welfare program).
3- See Fox, supra note 186, at 170. But see Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th
Cir. 1969); Cochran v. Sielaff, 405 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Ill. 1976) (economy a compelling
interest in prison diet case).
326 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974); see text accompanying notes 198-216 supra.
327 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Pell v. Procunier was the first prisoners' rights case decided
by the Supreme Court on first amendment grounds. The Pell Court did not rely heavily
on Martinez, and the use it did make of that opinion is not at all suggestive of defini-
tional balancing. See also text accompanying notes 219-33 supra.
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corollaries of security and safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
It classifies as noncompelling such administrative interests as
economy and convenience. Martinez, on the other hand, may be
read as categorizing the interests of security, order, and rehabili-
tation as substantial. The principal deficiency of this list is the
possibility that the state interests of economy or convenient
administration-interests generally rejected under the proposed
test-will be viewed as substantial under the rubric of promotion
of prison order. Nearly all good faith measures of prison ad-
ministrators are taken to promote institutional order. For exam-
ple, a regulation prohibiting the rescheduling of dining hours
for special groups or a rule banning the consumption of food in
cells would further the "substantial governmental interest of...
order" and thereby satisfy the first element of the Martinez test
despite the impossibility of celebrating the Muslim Fast of
Ramadan under such a regime;32 8 this regulation would fail the
first prong of the proposed test. Thus, even if Martinez is read as
employing a definitional balancing test, the proposed compelling
interest test is more demanding.
329
The Court's failure to elaborate on the three interests raises
an additional problem with the Martinez test. Absent some dis-
cussion of the security, order, and rehabilitation interests, the
attempted definitional balance is deprived of much of the legiti-
macy that comes from a reasoned argument that only these in-
terests are categorically acceptable. The refined compelling in-
terest test, on the other hand, attempts to avoid these difficulties
by discussing the nature and scope of its categories and testing
their adequacy by application.3 °
2. The Least Drastic Means Requirement
Even if a prison restriction on the free exercise of religion
survives the compelling interest element, it still must be sub-
jected to least drastic means analysis. This component of the
compelling interest test has long been recognized when constitu-
tional liberties are at stake; 33' the Court stated in Sherbert that if
the state were to establish grave abuses, endangering compelling
328 See text accompanying notes 64-85 supra. Such a regulation would probably also
meet the second prong of the Martinez test. See note 336 infra.
329 Cf. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 n.6 (2d Cir. 1975) (compelling interest
test characterized as imposing "more stringent demands" than Martinez substantial in-
terest approach).
33' See text accompanying notes 343-57 infra.
331 See, e.g., Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
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interests, still "it would plainly be incumbent upon [the state] to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would com-
bat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights. 332
Several prisoners have prevailed in religious liberty cases on the
ground that the challenged regulation was unnecessarily restric-
tive of free exercise rights .3 3 Despite its frequent and successful
use, the least drastic means test has always displayed what Pro-
fessor Ely calls "a latent ambiguity in the analysis, ' '33 4 an am-
biguity nowhere discussed in the case law. The least drastic
means requirement can be read two ways. Narrowly construed,
the requirement merely insists that there be no less restrictive
alternative capable of furthering the state's interest as much as
it is furthered by the challenged means-the "efficiency" ap-
proach. More broadly construed, the requirement permits no
less restrictive alternatives capable of serving the state's interest
sufficiently-the "sufficiency" approach. The "efficiency" ap-
proach, although endorsed in commentary and apparently used
in cases, 33 5 should be rejected as too weak, for it would permit
the use of any means yielding maximum efficiency: by defini-
tion, all other means would fail the requirement that they be as
efficient as the challenged means. Thus, no matter how drastic,
the most efficient means would be allowable, and only those
means that exceed the point of maximum efficiency and gratui-
tously restrict free exercise would be unconstitutional. Because
regulations that in this way outrun the interests they are de-
signed to serve are rarely formulated, 336 the "efficiency" ap-
311 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
3" See Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975); Wilson v. Beame, 380 F.
Supp. 1232 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
33' Ely, supra note 184, at 1484.
3" See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Struve, The Less-
Restrictive-Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1463 (1967).
326 But see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 198-216 supra. That the Martinez test, like those applications of the unrefined
compelling interest test discussed above, apparently uses the "efficiency" approach is
worth noting because the proposed "sufficiency" approach to the least drastic means
requirement in this way differs not only from the conventional compelling interest test
but also from the Martinez standard. Two reasons support the conclusion that Martinez
involves an "efficiency" interpretation of the least drastic means requirement. First,
Martinez explicitly derives its test from O'Brien, a case that rather clearly envisions an
efficiency approach. See Ely, supra note 184, at 1484-86; text accompanying notes
198-216 supra. Second, because of the broad censorship scheme involved in Martinez, it
is one of the rare cases in which an "efficiency" approach could invalidate a regulation
on the ground that it exceeds maximum "efficiency." See text accompanying notes
198-216 supra. If, as seems likely, the least drastic means element of Martinez is an
"efficiency" test, then its success in the peculiar circumstances of that case is not good
cause for preferring that approach to the proposed "sufficiency" test. Compare
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proach is of little help.
On the other hand, different problems inhere in the "suffi-
ciency" approach to the less drastic means test. This approach,
apparently applied by the Supreme Court in the old handbill
cases,337 has been challenged by at least one commentator as
being beyond the capabilities of the judiciary and inconsistent
with the separation of powers doctrine: "Since the Court lacks
the competency to measure the relative efficiency, cost, and
repressive effect of alternative measures, consideration of less
drastic means cannot provide any form or structure to [first
amendment analysis]. '33 8 In addition, the "sufficiency" approach
involves the courts in balancing "at the margin," comparing the
incremental furtherance of the asserted state interest with the
incremental restriction on free exercise. Such an evaluation is at
least in part plagued by the same infirmities present in all ad hoc
weighing of interests.
339
To minimize these difficulties with the "sufficiency" ap-
proach, this Comment proposes the erection of a rebuttable pre-
sumption that prison officials, even after establishing a compel-
ling justification for a restriction on free exercise, can afford to
exempt religious objectors from that regulation and instead sub-
ject them to less drastic, albeit less efficient, regulation. Only
when the state can convince the court that a regulation incor-
porating such an exemption will not sufficiently further the
compelling interest at stake will the presumption be successfully
rebutted. The precise point at which rebuttal occurs cannot, of
course, be identified a priori; and thus a measure of situational
evaluation inheres in this approach. Nevertheless, the presump-
tion serves to mitigate the formlessness of a "sufficiency" ap-
proach to the least drastic means test. Furthermore, this ap-
proach has been advocated in commentary 34" and sensibly
applied in at least one major case. In re Jenisonj4 ' which first
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
a33E.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (first amendment requires
toleration of some litter); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Organization, 307 U.S. 496
(1939).
338 78 YALE L.J. 464, 474 (1969). But see West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 640 (1943) ("[W]e act in these matters not by authority of our
competence but by force of our commissions.").
339 For a discussion of ad hoc balancing, see text accompanying notes 234-43 supra.
341 See, e.g., Clark, Guidelines for the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARV. L. REv. 327
(1969); Giannella, supra note 238, at 1389-90.
341 265 Minn. 96, 120 N.W.2d 515, vacated and remanded, 375 U.S. 14 (remanded
for consideration in light of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)), on remand, 267
Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963) (per curiam).
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reached the Minnesota Supreme Court prior to the 1963 deci-
sion in Sherbert, involved a Jehovah's Witness who took literally
the Biblical command "Judge not lest ye be judged" and refused
to serve as a juror. Her conviction for contempt of court was
initially affirmed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. After that
decision was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light
of Sherbert, the Minnesota court ruled that the state had the
burden of demonstrating that it could not afford a religious
exemption from jury duty for religious objectors. The state's
burden was not met, and the conviction was reversed. Although
not directly supportive, Jenison suggests the viability of the pro-
posed religious exemption approach to the least drastic means
requirement.
3 42
C. The Test Applied
The proposed compelling interest test can be applied with
relative ease in the diet and grooming cases.3 43 The prison in-
342 The presumption of an affordable religious exemption is less stringent than an
unmodified "sufficiency" approach to the least drastic means test, for the presumption,
if unrebutted, will result only in an exemption for religious objectors whereas an ad hoc
sufficiency approach could result in the invalidation of the entire regulatory scheme.
Even this milder version of the least drastic means test might be criticized because it
creates a special privilege for religious practitioners in violation of notions of equality of
treatment. See Fernandez, The Free Exercise of Religion, 36 S. CAL. L. REV. 546, 564-66
(1963). But see text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
The use in Jenison of a religious exemption analogous to the rebuttable presump-
tion scheme proposed by this Comment suggests that the entire compelling interest test
as outlined here can and should be adapted to nonprison free exercise claims. Such an
adaptation is required by the identity of religious liberty values inside and outside
prison, see text accompanying notes 60-71 supra, and should (1) apply the presumption
of an affordable religious exemption discussed above, because this approach to the least
drastic means requirement is equally suited to prison and nonprison cases; and (2)
evolve a classification scheme that would categorize each nonprison state interest as
either generally compelling or generally noncompelling. Because the nonprison cases
arise in contexts more variable than the prison environment, classification of all the
state interests that might be advanced is considerably more difficult, if possible at all,
than categorization of the limited number of interests that arise in a prison context.
Among the legitimate state interests often asserted as justifying abridgments of free
exercise, administrative convenience should be considered noncompelling. See cases
cited note 324 supra. By contrast, the state's interest in raising an army in time of war
should be considered categorically "compelling," as the Supreme Court implicitly held
in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971), a conscientious objector case.
Classifying the state interest in raising an army in time of war as categorically compel-
ling would not, however, resolve a free exercise attack on conscription; the state would
still have to rebut the presumption of an affordable religious exemption in order to
impose constitutionally a selective service system that does not exempt conscientious
objectors to war. But see Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Further clas-
sification should begin with the two poles here identified and definitionally balance
from those points to the other commonly asserted state interests.
13 The refined test is here applied only to the grooming and diet cases because (1)
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS
terests offered as justifications for denying kosher diets to Or-
thodox Jewish inmates and pork-free diets to Muslim prisoners
are budgetary contraints and administrative convenience.
3 44
Neither of these interests is considered compelling under the
proposed test.3 45 Therefore, without further inquiry, these re-
strictions on religious dietary practices are unconstitutional
abridgments of the free exercise guarantee. Similarly, the refusal
of prison administrators to accommodate the special needs of
Muslims observing the December Fast of Ramadan is unjustifi-
able because it furthers only the prison interest in economical
and convenient administration of the dining program. Whether
such accommodation is arranged by providing Muslims with
meals in their cells, or by scheduling all prisoners' evening meals
after sunset during December, when sunset occurs rather early,
is a matter of official discretion. Accommodation, however, is a
matter of constitutional imperative.
As is clear from its application in the Ramadan cases, the
proposed test differs from both the "relatively" compelling
interest test and the Martinez approach. Under the Martinez
analysis, the asserted prison interest in administrative conve-
nience would probably be considered "substantial" because it
furthers the state interest in order.346 And vindication of the
free exercise claim under the least drastic means element of
Martinez would be problematic given the "efficiency" approach
apparently contemplated in the second stage of the Martinez
test.347 The "relatively" compelling interest test similarly cannot
be relied on to insure that Muslim prisoners will have the oppor-
tunity to observe Ramadan properly. Under the "relatively"
compelling interest test, which is essentially an ad hoc balancing
approach,348 one court found that the state interests in economy
and convenience are compelling relative to the "minor" free exer-
cise abridgment produced by regulations making the celebration
of Ramadan impossible.3 49 Once such regulations are found to
be justified by a compelling state interest, they then need only
the grooming and diet cases implicate nearly the entire range of commonly asserted
state interests, thereby suitably challenging and demonstrating the proposed test; and (2)
the grooming and diet issues have been most recently and most inconsistently litigated.
See text accompanying notes 1-35 supra.
344 See text accompanying notes 64-85 supra.
14' See text accompanying notes 318-25 supra.
146 See text accompanying notes 326-30 supra.
... See note 336 supra.
348 See text accompanying notes 298-306 supra.
349 See Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1969); text accompanying
notes 303-04 supra.
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pass the weak "efficiency" reading of the least drastic means test
to be upheld under the "relatively" compelling interest test. The
proposed approach, in contrast to the Martinez and "relatively"
compelling interest tests, would clearly invalidate these blanket
restrictions on the observance of Ramadan.
The grooming cases require a slightly more involved
analysis. The prison interests commonly offered in support of
regulations governing personal appearance are security, identifi-
cation, and hygiene: long hair and beards threaten security by
facilitating the concealment of contraband and weapons, thwart
identification efforts by enabling inmates to change their ap-
pearance, and jeopardize hygiene because prisoners cannot keep
long hair and beards clean. The hygiene interest may be dis-
missed as administrative and therefore not compelling, absent
conditions so unhealthy as to threaten other prisoners. If the
wearing of long hair and beards by religiously motivated inmates
results in a diminution of cleanliness in the institution-a prop-
osition that is dubious given, for example, the injunction of the
Muslim religion that its practitioners wash five times daily3 5'-
then a little less cleanliness is the sacrifice required by the first
amendment.
The security interest is classified as compelling, 351 thereby
triggering the least drastic means element of the proposed test.
The state must then rebut the presumption that its interest in
the detection of contraband and weapons cannot be served by
exempting religious objectors from the appearance regulations
and imposing on them instead an alternative burden not restric-
tive of free exercise. Along with the periodic body searches to
which prisoners are subjected because contraband is most easily
concealed on the body or in clothing, a simple hair or beard
search of religious objectors could be conducted simulta-
neously 52 The state should thus not be allowed to rebut suc-
cessfully the presumption of an affordable religious exemption.
Partial rebuttal remains a theoretical possibility. The state
conceivably could persuade the court that a beard search will not
35"See Brief for Appellants at 3, Burgin v. Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.
1976).
351 See text accompanying notes 318-23 supra.
This reasoning could also be urged in calling for a complete abandonment of
appearance regulations. Such an attack could be brought by nonreligious prisoners on a
right-to-privacy theory and could succeed for the reasons stated above. A court might
hold, however, that the free exercise claim is weightier than the privacy claim, and that
although the former succeeds, the latter must fail. An evaluation of this result is beyond
the scope of this Comment. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
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be sufficiently prophylactic unless the beards are kept reasonably
short. If such a showing were made, 353 the presumption of an
affordable religious exemption would be rebutted to an extent,
and the regulation of beards would have to be modified but not
discontinued. A degree of ad hoc balancing inheres in the notion
of a partial rebuttal; as discussed above,354 the presumption in
favor of a religious exemption is not altogether free of situa-
tional evaluation. The presumption approach to the least drastic
means test nonetheless would invalidate a total ban on wearing
long hair and beards insofar as it rested on the state's interest in
security. In this way, the proposed standard differs from the
"relatively" compelling interest test and the Martinez test, both of
which apparently include the "efficiency" reading of the least
drastic means requirement.355 Under the "efficiency" approach a
court might be persuaded that beard and hair searches do not
further the prison interest in security as efficiently as a total ban
on long hair and beards, because of the remote chance that
contraband or a weapon will go undetected-a chance that is
eliminated under a regime of no beards or long hair. Conse-
quently, no means less drastic than total prohibition exist when
this approach is applied. Under the presumption approach,
which is essentially a "sufficiency" reading of the least drastic
means element,3 56 the court should find that beard and hair
searches, although perhaps not as effective as a total ban, further
the state's interest in security enough to constitute a viable and
less restrictive means. The state accordingly would fail to rebut
completely the presumption of an affordable religious exemp-
tion from the prohibition of long hair and beards because an
alternative scheme exists for sufficient vindication of the security
interest.
Similarly, the identification interest cannot support a total
prohibition against wearing long hair or beards. Although
primarily an administrative concern, prisoner identification
coincides sufficiently with the security interest to be classified as
353 The suggestion that long beards could not practically be searched is presented
arguendo. The rationality of the position that weapons and contraband are more easily
concealed in longer beards is doubtful because the size of items that are concealable at
all is so small that they would likely be equally concealable in either long or short
beards. A regulation allowing beards provided they are kept short would infringe upon
the religious practices of Orthodox Jews, who do not shave at all, but not those of
Muslims, who simply do not shave entirely. This distinction might result in an equal
protection problem.
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compelling. The identification interest, however, like the security
interest, probably fails the least drastic means requirement of the
proposed test. Religious objectors could be exempted from ap-
pearance regulation and rephotographed regularly for identifi-
cation purposes as their appearances change. This rephoto-
graphing scheme should prove an effective means of monitoring
appearance, because prisoners, deprived of razors and other
such implements, usually cannot secretly and quickly alter their
appearances by cutting an identifying beard or braid. 35' The
major opposition to such a policy would be that the plan is costly
and inconvenient; this opposition, of course, is not compelling
and therefore could not rebut the presumption of a free exercise
exception. Because the three asserted justifications fail the pro-
posed test, prohibitions on wearing beards or long hair should
be held violative of the free exercise clause as applied to religious
prisoners.
V. CONCLUSION
Prison free exercise cases stand at the junction of two an-
tagonistic lines of Supreme Court authority. In nonprison free
exercise cases, the Court has displayed a special solicitude for
those who obey the commands of their faith. In most prisoners'
rights cases, the Court has shown considerably less solicitude for
those who must daily obey the commands of prison authorities.
This Comment, after surveying existing results and evaluating
current approaches, has proposed that the same test be applied
in all free exercise cases because the values protected by the
religious liberty guarantee exist with equal intensity on both
sides of prison walls. This test, the compelling interest standard,
has been refined to comprise a definitional balancing approach
with a least drastic means element. This classification scheme,
and the accompanying presumption in favor of a religious ex-
emption from regulations enacted in furtherance of a compel-
ling interest, should promote simplicity of application, clarity
and consistency of reasoning, and, most importantly, fairness of
result. Perhaps if such careful attention is more often given to
the free exercise claims of prisoners, the words of Justice Field in
Ho Ah Kow will ring true:
351 If prison officials can convince a court that, despite security precautions, in-
mates so often possess the means to alter their appearance quickly and drastically if
allowed to wear a beard or a long braid, the presumption in favor of a religious exemp-
tion may be somewhat rebutted. A total prohibition, however, would not be justified
even on this showing, because short beards or braids would still pose a significantly
smaller problem.
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It is certainly something in which a citizen of the
United States may feel a generous pride that the gov-
ernment of his country extends protection to all persons
within its jurisdiction; and that every blow aimed at any
of them, however humble, come from what quarter it
may, is "caught upon the broad shield of our blessed
constitution and our equal laws.
'358
358 12 F. Cas. 252, 256 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (footnote omitted).
